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Abstract
This book exposes a much needed discussion on the interconnectedness 
between objects, organisms, machines and elemental forces. It seeks to 
disturb dogmatic ontologies that privilege human life and successfully 
questions the separation between the natural and human worlds. By doing so, 
the collection confronts, challenges, and energises discussion beyond 
International Relations’ traditional territorial lines. By revealing the fragility of 
mainstream narratives of the ‘human,’ each author in this collection 
contributes to an unsettling vision of a posthuman world. Questions of what 
the future beyond the Anthropocene looks like pervasively infiltrate the 
collection and move away from a system that all too often relies on binary 
relationships. In contrast to this binary view of the world, Reflections on the 
(post)human (re)entagles the innate complexities found within the world and 
brings forward a plurality of views on posthumanism. 
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Introduction
Posthuman International Relations
MATT MCDONALD AND AUDRA MITCHELL
Preparing an introductory essay for an edited collection is never a 
straightforward enterprise. Managing the tasks of defining the scope of that 
collection, providing an outline of the contributions themselves and pointing to 
themes and intersections connecting the papers, as well as the questions 
they raise, is never a simple task. But in this instance, those challenges are 
much greater as a result of profound uncertainty and even contestation over 
the key term animating this collection and the expansive licence given to the 
authors of the thoughtful papers that follow. And, although the initial 
discussions on this theme emerged in a workshop in which a handful of the 
authors participated, they have grown and transformed across a series of 
discussions at several conferences in several countries and continents. In 
each iteration, new voices have joined to elaborate, contest and innovate on 
the initial themes. 
Yet the scope of issues covered in these contributions, the significant licence 
given to contributors, and the relatively organic nature of the collection 
constitutes a key strength. So too does the variety amongst – and sometimes 
the productive tension between – interpretations, conceptualizations and 
arguments advanced in these interventions constitute an important 
contribution to existing debates. A discussion of the posthuman and its 
relationship to the study of international relations cannot be narrowly defined, 
nor can one voice (ours or a specified contributor’s) be allocated the task of 
providing the definition of the posthuman or the other set of concepts 
addressed here: security, ecology, anthropocentrism or the Anthropocene. All 
are sites of debate themselves, and raise questions about what the 
interrogation of ‘the human’ and ‘humanity’s’ relationship to other beings 
mean for the study and practice of international relations in the contemporary 
context. As such, they are rightly points of intellectual animation and 
contestation. And as Audra Mitchell notes in the first essay to follow, it is 
entirely appropriate that conversations about the posthuman and IR, here or 
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in other contexts, should aim primarily to recognise and raise such questions 
rather than claim to provide definitive answers to them.
The ‘posthuman turn’ in the study of international relations, a phrasing certain 
to raise eyebrows and possibly ire amongst some IR scholars, essentially 
asks us to reflect critically on the role of humanity in the contemporary global 
context. More specifically, this provocation asks us to defamiliarise 
mainstream narratives of ‘humanity’ so that it is possible to better understand 
how it is constructed, performed and protected. Given rapid and far-reaching 
technological development, unprecedented environmental change, and more 
broadly the profoundly transnational nature of key challenges confronting the 
earth, this approach asks whether we can continue to work with implicit but 
powerful modern conceptions of a humanity separated from nature.1 This 
question arises even before recognition of the profound threat now posed to 
other living beings or future generations – of humans and nonhumans alike - 
or the challenges posed by recognising and engaging non-living beings in the 
realm of ethics and security. Clearly, these moves raise a big set of questions. 
But for us and for many of the contributors here, those questions loom large 
(and indeed become urgent and necessary) in the context of the 
Anthropocene: the argument that the earth has entered a new geological era 
in which humans themselves have become the dominant influence on the 
conditions of planetary existence. As Delf Rothe’s contribution notes, the 
Anthropocene does not in itself dictate an appropriate or even likely politics of 
response. However, given the impact of the ecological, social and political 
changes associated with this proposed era, it should force us to reflect on 
some of the key assumptions and guiding principles of IR, in theory and in 
practice.
The contributions that follow address many of these crucial questions. Few, if 
any, are entirely new questions. Grappling with the nature-human divide in 
social and ecological thought has a long history (see Eckersley 1992), and 
questions have long been asked about how IR has been constructed to 
confine its analyses to (imagined communities of) humans, assumed to be 
separate from a posited ‘natural world’ (Anderson 1983; Saurin 1996). The 
nature of the contributions made here, however, is distinctive in drawing 
together a new generation of scholars who are bringing these questions to 
bear on the most pressing ecological, political, security and ethical challenges 
facing the planet. In so doing, they draw on discourses that traverse the 
social sciences and humanities. For instance, several contributors are 
inspired by the ‘new materialisms’ (see Bennett 2010; Connolly 2011; Coole 
1  Indeed posthuman accounts reject the concept of ‘nature’ as a human construct 
that precisely serves to separate humanity from the conditions of its existence. See 
Morton 2007.
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and Frost 2011), which urge attunement to the lively property of materials. 
Others focus on articulations of the animals, plants and other nonhuman life 
forms that are co-implicated in the project of earthly survival, and that 
challenge traditional concepts of security, violence and threat (see Cudworth 
and Hobden 2011; Mitchell 2014). Meanwhile, some of the authors 
represented in this volume draw on object-oriented ontologies (Harman 2005; 
Bogost 2012) to explore how objects of all kinds construct and constrain 
existence beyond the boundaries of ‘human’ agency. Many of the 
contributions to this volume think alongside pioneering work in science and 
technology studies (Latour 2013; Stengers 2005; 2011) and, in particular, 
feminist approaches to this field (Haraway 2008; Barad 2007).  The range of 
approaches, methodologies and philosophical frameworks discussed here 
demonstrate the diversity of ways in which ‘posthumanisms’ are articulated to 
challenge the core concepts and assumptions of IR. 
Despite this diversity, at least two key themes suggest themselves across the 
contributions to follow. First, and especially for those contributors engaging 
directly with the question of environmental change, the relationship between 
anthropocentrism and ecocentrism looms large. Most strikingly, and perhaps 
surprisingly, in engaging this relationship in IR and even in locating 
themselves in a set of conversations about the posthuman, none of the 
contributors want to wholly reject one in favour of another. While all the 
contributors universally reject dominant forms of anthropocentrism, they vary 
both in their sense of the possibility or desirability of wholly moving beyond 
an anthropocentric frame. Instead, many of the interventions included in this 
volume seek re-articulations of the relations between humans and other 
beings that can mitigate the uncritical domination of the latter by the former. 
Similarly, while all of the authors in this volume express support in some form 
for moving towards increasing recognition of the embeddedness of humanity 
in nature, there is a notable sense of scepticism about the prospect of pure 
modes of ecocentrism. Reasons for this scepticism range from the analytical 
to the political (see Rafi Youatt’s contribution), with Olaf Corry pointing to the 
intuitive appeal but limited political purchase of a position in which human 
society is viewed as ‘dispensable to the Earth’. While Carolin Kaltofen (this 
volume) suggests that this ambivalence about ecocentrism may indeed 
challenge the extent to which contributions can genuinely be labelled 
‘posthuman’, most endorse an expansion of human registers, care and 
consideration in reorienting attention towards an ecological perspective.
Second, and following the above, another key theme is that of relationality. All 
contributors, in different ways, challenge the tendency in IR to isolate entities 
and variables to make sweeping claims about ‘the international’ that ignore or 
obscure other kinds of relations. This is particularly evident in Cameron 
Harrington’s discussion, drawing on feminist thought, of the desirability of an 
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ethics of care that focuses on the relationship between the particular and the 
universal. It is evident, too, in Elke Schwarz’s call to recognise and 
interrogate the nature of the relationship between humanity and technology, 
which profoundly challenges accounts of security weaponry that view these 
simply as objects employed by users. For contributors to this volume, 
profound and often deeply complex interrelationships- between people and 
objects; people and people; people and other living beings- necessitate new 
ways of thinking and engaging IR. This extends too, for Stefanie Fishel and 
Matt McDonald in particular, to the need for a radical reorientation of political 
practice, norms and institutions to respond adequately to the political cul-de-
sacs dominant accounts of IR have taken us down so far (see also Burke et 
al. 2014; 2016).  
The contributions that follow are grouped in two parts. Part 1 is themed 
around a theoretical discussion of the ‘human’, the ‘posthuman’ and 
‘posthumanism’, while Part 2 contains contributions analysing ecology, non-
human species and the Anthropocene. Neither parts, nor contributions within 
them, are wholly distinct from each other. While these broad thematic sign-
posts are intended to help orient the reader, the deliberately significant scope 
of this volume and the licence given to contributors ensures that as many 
intersections occur between parts as within them.
In the first contribution to follow, the first in Part 1 of the volume, Audra 
Mitchell reflects on scholarship and debates around posthuman security in 
international relations networks to date. Noting controversy about the scope, 
role and desirability of both the ‘posthuman’ and ‘security’, her intervention 
points to both key axes of an evolving debate and avenues for future 
research. She ultimately makes a case for a ‘reflexive anthropo-centredness’, 
and suggests that future research in this space could benefit from drawing 
more on postcolonial theory, Indigenous knowledges and increased 
engagement with the planetary dimension of posthuman security. In the 
subsequent contribution, Carolin Kaltofen explores key conceptualisations 
and uses of the ‘posthuman’ in IR thought. Her paper situates interventions 
on the ‘posthuman’ in terms of different (and at times contradictory) 
philosophical and theoretical traditions, noting ultimately that much 
scholarship purporting to engage with the posthuman is better understood as 
an attempt to rearticulate humanism, albeit often in progressive ways. Her 
contribution compels us to drill deeper and reflect on the traditions and 
assumptions upon which claims are made, regarding posthumanism and IR 
scholarship more broadly.
The third contribution in this section, by Elke Schwarz, returns to the more 
specific theme of ‘posthuman security’, though in the process raises large 
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questions about conceptions of humanity in IR. Using the example of new 
technologies of war and security, she points to the ways in which such 
technology needs to be viewed as more than a mere tool for the pursuit of 
security controlled by humans, instead raising important questions about how 
we conceive of ethics in war and even how conceptions of humanity might be 
affected or altered by the pursuit and use of technology. Rafi Youatt’s 
contribution takes a step further back, reflecting on the anthropocentrism 
often depicted as serving a fundamental rationale for the posthuman turn and 
a key impediment to progressive human-nature relations. His analysis here 
suggests the need to question the simple human-nature binary, in the 
process pointing to the realities of multiple forms of humanity and humanness 
and multiple forms and dynamics of nature. It also asks broader questions 
about distinctions made between living and non-living objects and beings.
The final contribution in Part 1, by Stefanie Fishel, develops a three act 
structure for exploring the posthuman in IR. Developing the performative 
theme, her paper makes the case that we should focus less on the condition 
of the post-human than on the process of post-humanising, which must entail 
a shift away from traditional forms of anthropocentrism which separate 
humans from nature. She concludes with a call to arms for the reconstruction 
of humanity and the discipline (and practice) of IR to address contemporary 
global challenges, building in the process on her recent work elsewhere 
(Burke et al. 2016).
The first paper of Part 2, by Matt McDonald, deals most directly with the 
concept of security. In this paper he makes the case that the increasing 
tendency to securitise climate change raises important questions about how 
the security-climate relationship is understood. Pointing to the limits and 
pathologies of discourses that emphasise the preservation of national, 
international and even human security, he makes a case for endorsing and 
pursuing a discourse of climate security oriented towards long-term 
ecosystem resilience, in the process encouraging practices focused on 
mitigation and the rights and needs of future generations and other living 
beings. This security focus is also prominent in Cameron Harrington’s 
contribution, which similarly explores the type of sensibility that should inform 
a more progressive approach to unprecedented environmental change in the 
context of the Anthropocene. Here he makes a case, drawing on feminist 
thought, for an ethics of care in informing how we view security in posthuman 
terms. This, he suggests, is attentive to relations between the particular and 
the universal and recognises our entanglement in the experiences and 
vulnerability of those beyond our immediate horizon. 
Delf Rothe’s contribution simultaneously continues the security theme while 
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returning to the question raised by Carolin Kaltofen of the assumptions 
underpinning existing scholarship in IR on the posthuman. In particular, he 
focuses on the meaning given to the Anthropocene. Here, he argues that 
scholarship on the Anthropocene frequently assumes that recognition of this 
new geological era will serve as a trigger for a reconfigured and progressive 
relationship between nature and humanity. In the process, he suggests that 
such scholarship insufficiently acknowledges the multiple meanings that might 
be given to the Anthropocene itself, and crucially the set of varied practices 
these may in turn encourage. In this sense, he argues for a richer sociological 
account of the Anthropocene and meanings attributed to it, in order to 
develop a richer and more realistic account of the ethics and politics of 
security in the context of the Anthropocene.
Finally, Olaf Corry’s intervention examines the role of ‘nature’ in international 
relations thought. Reflecting directly on how IR has engaged ‘nature’ or ‘the 
environment’ over time, Corry suggests that IR had ultimately forgotten about 
rediscovering nature since World War II. Turning his attention to the question 
of how IR should engage the human-nature/social-natural distinction, he 
ultimately makes the case for preserving an analytical distinction between the 
two while recognising the possibility for dialectical ‘progress’ associated with 
changing conceptions of both the natural world and the human condition.
The contributions to this volume are challenging and thought-provoking, often 
asking fundamental questions about the way those interested in IR can and 
should think about politics, ethics, security, unprecedented environmental 
change and technological development, humanity and the human-nature 
divide. These questions could scarcely be larger, and this volume certainly 
does not provide definitive answers to all of them. Indeed, in some ways, it 
raises as many questions as it resolves – but they are questions worth asking 
if IR is to enable and influence meaningful forms of political practice in the 
face of planetary challenges. And while this volume identifies numerous 
pathologies in IR scholarship and global political practice, it also points 
towards alternative politics, ethical registers and analytical frameworks better 
suited to face up to these challenges. 
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1
‘Posthuman Security’: 
Reflections from an Open-ended 
Conversation
AUDRA MITCHELL
A couple of years ago, I invited a group of scholars (including several of the 
authors in this volume) to get together and share their views on something 
called ‘posthuman security’. While we all had different disciplinary 
backgrounds, expertise, questions and commitments, we shared the intuition 
that international security is not solely a matter of securing human lives and 
bodies. Instead, we contended that diverse beings other than humans are 
implicated in the conditions of (in)security. With this in mind, we wanted to 
think collectively about what the notion of ‘security’ means in worlds 
intersected and co-constituted by various kinds of beings: humans, other 
organisms, machines, elemental forces, diverse materials – plus hybrids, 
intersections and pluralities of all of the above (and more). In turn, we wanted 
to think about what the ‘posthuman’ means when we bring it into the realm of 
security. For instance, does embracing a more-than-human or post-human 
ontology mean giving up on notions of security as stability, sustainability or 
resilience? On the other hand, does embracing such concepts force one back 
into a humanism that reinforces rigid and exclusive understandings of what 
‘humanity’ is, and what is worthy of being secured? Over the last two years, 
we have met to hash out these issues with a widening group of interlocutors 
in workshops and panels in the UK, Australia, Italy and the US. So what kinds 
of insight have these discussions inspired? 
One remarkable aspect of the discussions was the breadth and range of 
positions that are identified as ‘posthuman’ or ‘posthumanist’. In her recent 
E-IR piece, Elke Schwarz (this volume) notes this diversity, but suggests that 
posthumanism can be approached largely in terms of transhumanism, 
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hybridity and the cyborg. This is indeed an important current in posthumanist 
thinking, and one that, as Schwarz suggests, has important implications for 
traditional security concerns such as the conduct of warfare and the 
distribution of agency in violence. On the other hand, many contemporary 
posthumanists are inspired by engagements with the liveliness and quirkiness 
of matter and its implications for ontology, agency and causation. They draw 
on sources such as new materialism of (Coole and Frost 2011; Bennett, 2010; 
Connolly, 2011) and the politics of affect (Massumi 2015; Protevi 2013). 
Carolin Kaltofen’s work draws on these sources to examine the emergence of 
hybrid posthumans in the worlds of the virtual and sonic warscapes. Still other 
participants in our discussion are concerned with how thinking in ecological 
terms transforms perspectives on what it means to be ‘human’ – and what it 
means to be ‘secure’. For instance, the work of Erika Cudworth and Stephen 
Hobden (2014, 2015) examines the implications of animal bodies and 
subjectivities in warfare. In a similar light, Stefanie Fishel’s work on the 
subjectivity of dolphins and Matt McDonald’s (this volume) new framework for 
‘ecological security’ each call for profound transformations of the perceived 
subjects of security and their influence in international law and norms (see 
also Mitchell 2014b). Rafi Youatt’s (2014) work on international regimes of 
biodiversity show how this category has become progressively securitised, 
altering ideas of what ‘life’ is and what should be protected. Meanwhile, other 
authors are concerned with the agentic role of the ‘things’ we tend to construe 
as rigid and lifeless, in particular, their ability to provoke human thought and 
action, structure violence and create disruption (see Grove 2014). Even this 
wide variety of approaches only scratches the surface of the perspectives that 
are expressed under the rubric of posthumanism or ‘posthuman security’. 
These terms do not refer to ‘theory’ or ‘framework’, but rather to a swarm of 
resonating, sometimes intersecting and often conflicting lines of thought. 
In this context, one of the most prevalent aspects of our discussions on 
‘posthuman security’ is the tension between identifying convergences in these 
contributions and maintaining the openness of the discourse. To my mind, 
one of the most promising and radical aspects of these discussions has been 
their stubborn resistance to resolution. However, the inertia of scholarly 
debate tends to push such discussions towards the articulation of definitions 
and particular ‘projects’ or frameworks. Our struggles with this tension have 
produced a number of rich debates. 
One of the most salient of these debates surrounds whether or not ‘the 
human’ has a place in ‘posthuman’ security. At a 2015 roundtable discussion 
on the subject at the European International Studies Association Convention 
in Sicily, there was significant contention over whether or not the visions of 
‘posthuman security’ presented by various contributors were radical enough. 
Some of our interlocutors expressed the view that anything short of the total 
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elimination of anthropocentric thinking from IR simply reproduced existing 
paradigms, in particular, the ontology of liberal capitalism. Others contended 
that it is impossible – and undesirable – to excise ‘humanity’ entirely from a 
discussion of security or politics more generally. I have a great deal of 
sympathy for the latter perspective. Elsewhere, I have advocated the 
transformation of security thinking around the principle of ‘weak 
anthropocentrism’ – a position which acknowledges the embeddedness of 
humans in complex worlds co-constituted by diverse beings (Mitchell 2014a). 
Perhaps a better term, in fact, is ‘reflexive anthropo-centredness’: the ability 
to be mindful of the various ways that one might be figured, conditioned or 
disciplined as ‘human’, and how they affect one’s sense of relationality, ethics, 
politics and co-existence. 
From these perspectives, ‘security’ cannot be understood as a good or status 
that accrues to bounded, separated, ‘purely human’ beings. Instead, concepts 
of (in)security, violence and harm must be understood in relation to distinct, 
irreplaceable worlds and the relations that bind them. These approaches also 
highlight how existing logics of security function as a set of ethical boundaries 
that isolate a narrowly-defined category of ‘humanity’ from the diverse worlds 
that co-constitute it (Mitchell 2016b). Ironically, this strategy renders 
‘humanity’ less secure in two major ways. First, it widens the gulf between the 
‘human’ being and the relations that sustain it, as well as knowledge of how to 
maintain them. Second, by illustrating the constructed nature of ‘humanity’ as 
an ethical category, it opens this category up to further contractions and 
destabilizations. From traditional security perspectives that focus on 
maintaining ‘humanity-as-it-is’, this is deeply problematic. However, some 
modes of posthumanism suggest that it is precisely the destabilization of 
‘humanity’ that can make it possible to transcend rigid categories such as 
gender, race and sexuality (Braidotti 2013; Mitchell 2016). 
Viewed from this angle, it is not possible to entirely escape the constructs, 
norms and shared experiences that help to define one’s life as a human. 
However, the idea of what it means to be (post)human can be transformed by 
a deep engagement with alternative ontologies, cosmologies and multiple, co-
constituting worlds. This suggests that between the two extremes suggested 
by our interlocutors – a radical, eliminative posthumanism and a relapse into 
unreflective humanism – there exists a wide space of relations. It is these 
(international) relations that our discussions probe. In this sense, our 
discussions are post-humanist. That is, they situate themselves in a range of 
critical positions in relation to humanism, particularly the dominant variety that 
underpins international frameworks such as international norms of 
humanitarianism (Mitchell 2014b). But they are not anti-human: they embrace 
the deep plurality of ways in which one can be, or become, (post)human. 
They also encourage the practice of reflecting critically on the category of 
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‘humanity’ better to grasp the nature of violence, harm and crisis. 
Another flashpoint in our discussions concerns the concept of ‘security’. In 
particular, various contributors have asked whether it makes any sense to 
continue pursuing security in radically relational worlds disrupted by global 
crises such as climate change and mass extinction. Moreover, the 
emergence of hybrids, cyborgs and transhumans suggests that the entire 
category of humanity is vulnerable to dissolution – along with the frameworks 
of law, ethics and global norms it underpins. It is clear from our discussions 
that security as stasis is not feasible: it does not match with the exigencies of 
a dynamic, entangled and volatile earth. Indeed, one of the major arguments 
included in the recent ‘Planet Politics Manifesto’ (Burke et al. 2016) is that 
existing frameworks and assumptions of international politics do not ‘match 
the earth’, and must be rebuilt if they are to do so. 
At the same time, extending existing logics of security ‘beyond the human’ to 
penetrate additional dimensions of earthly co-existence threatens to 
compound regimes of biopolitical control. The recent work of Mark Evans and 
Julian Reid (2013) illustrates how fear over climate change and mass 
extinction has fuelled neo-liberal modes of sovereignty rooted in the 
production and ‘resilience’ of bare, often commodified, life. A good example of 
this can be found in contemporary conservation strategies that convert 
‘biodiversity’ into registers of financial value and monetary instruments – 
including ‘biodiversity derivatives’ (Mandel et al. 2010) – as a response to the 
threat of extinction. Such practices respond to the annihilation of worlds and 
life-forms by attempting scientifically to manage the processes of (bare) life 
and death. In so doing, they condemn all forms and expressions of life to 
existence in ‘survival mode’, compelled to conform to a specific 
understanding of ‘life’ and its persistence through time. 
As this example suggests, there are strong critical reasons to resist existing 
drives to envelop more and more aspects of the more-than-human within 
existing security discourses. Our discussions have stressed the need for 
attention to the double-edged sword of making security ‘more-than-human’. 
However, they have also identified important visions for opening up the 
meaning of security. For instance, Tony Burke’s (2015) recent work on 
‘security cosmopolitanism’ offers an ambitious new vision of insecurity as 
‘processes that threaten or cause serious harm to human beings, 
communities, and ecosystems; harm to their structures of living, dignity, and 
survival’. His work calls for the transformation of understandings of security to 
become responsive to the nature and dynamics of vibrant, diverse systems – 
human, organic, material, technological – across time and space. It suggests 
that the kind of ‘security’ that might emerge from a serious engagement with 
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posthumanist thought may not resemble anything like traditional and existing 
paradigms. In this sense, perhaps this line of thought would better be called 
‘post-human post-security’. 
So it is safe to say that most of the contributors to this discussion are not fully 
comfortable with or committed to either ‘posthumanism’ or ‘security’. Why, 
then, do we all find ourselves repeatedly drawn to engage with them, 
juxtapose them and explore their resonances? I think this is largely because 
their intersection opens up a series of problems, questions and critiques that 
break from established paradigms and hold the promise of alternative futures. 
So where are discussions of posthuman security going next? 
While I can only speak from my own perspective, I see a number of avenues 
in which these discourses can continue to break ground. First, discussions of 
posthumanism and security can engage more robustly with postcolonial 
theory (an issue around which Cudworth and Hobden’s work has broken 
ground). In particular, there is considerable promise in exploring how highly 
normative categories of ‘humanity’ are implicated in the construction of 
exclusive categories such as species and race. To give just one example, 
Achille Mbembe’s On the Postcolony (2002) brilliantly articulates how the 
category of animality has underpinned colonial violence against humans and 
other animals. More recently, he has called on humans to address the 
Anthropocene by ‘see[ing] ourselves clearly, not as an act of secession from 
the rest of the humanity, but in relation to ourselves and to other selves with 
whom we share the universe’ (Mbembe 2014, 15). There is huge scope to 
identify the shared logic of arbitrary division and hierarchy that underpin 
regimes of violence against any and all beings that fail to fit within 
mainstream norms of ‘humanity’. 
However, ‘posthumanist’ thought also needs to engage more directly with its 
unacknowledged debt to Indigenous philosophy and ways of thinking. As my 
collaborator Zoe Todd (2014) has pointed out, new materialist and post-
humanist modes of thought ignore and often efface the roots of many of their 
key tenets – profound relationality, multi-species community and an ecological 
ethic – in Indigenous philosophy and thought. ‘Indigenous thought’ is not a 
single, homogenous category. Instead, it is an admittedly inadequate way of 
signalling towards the hugely plural, singular bodies of thought, cosmologies, 
philosophies and lived knowledge kept and created by Indigenous peoples 
across the earth and over millennia. While none of these ways of knowing can 
be reduced to any other, some ideas – for instance, the co-constitution of 
beings – resonate across them. Juanita Sundberg (2014, 38) has recently 
critiqued ‘posthumanist’ thought on the basis that it ‘enacts the world as 
universe, meaning the ontological assumption of a singular reality or nature, 
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about which different cultures offer distinct interpretations’. Instead, if 
posthumanisms can recognise other worlds and cosmologies, this may open 
up new conversations across and amongst bodies of knowledge. In particular, 
by engaging seriously with plural forms of Indigenous thought, discussions of 
posthumanism and security can move towards a more self-critical 
understanding of the cosmologies they espouse and the forms of violence 
they might unwittingly condone. In addition, they might gain an appreciation of 
plural meanings of violence, harm and insecurity. I am exploring this pathway 
in my current work, which involves re-thinking the ethical dimensions of global 
extinction by engaging with plural Indigenous cosmologies and the 
communities who keep them. This involves thinking with contemporary 
Indigenous writers, artists and activists to theorise extinction, but also to 
understand its sources in large-scale forms of worlding associated with ‘the 
global’. 
Another direction which discussions of posthuman security can take is to 
engage more directly with the planet, and the specific conditions of (in)
security on earth. This entails thinking about the elemental, geological and 
cosmological conditions of life on this planet. For instance, the work of 
geographer Nigel Clark (2011) urges humans to embrace the finite, deeply 
contingent existence furnished by an earth that is less dependent on them 
than they are on it. He claims that human existence is contingent upon 
conditions created by previous (largely extinct) life forms and by inhuman 
forces, both contemporary and temporally distant. From this perspective, 
existence is a gift given to humans – and to all existent earthlings. Instead of 
struggling to secure it at all costs, and resenting the finitude that comes along 
with it, he argues that humans should embrace an ethic of gratitude towards 
the Earth. This may include welcoming new worlds and beings – for instance, 
transhumans, hybrids or post-human organisms – that threaten the 
boundaries of humanity and endanger existing forms of human life. From this 
perspective, engaging with the post-human may actually involve thinking a 
world without humans, or a world in which existing modes of human life are 
no longer possible. That, in turn, requires relinquishing the idea of security as 
perpetual existence to be ensured at all costs (see Mitchell 2017). For many 
theorists of security, this might appear to be a frightening and counter-
productive stance. However, along with the renunciation of security-as-we-
know it would come the freedom to celebrate and cherish the ‘gift’ of 
existence on a volatile planet. How these insights and ethical vocations might 
re-shape understandings of security and global ethics cries out for further 
discussion. 
These are a few of the new directions that the discussion of ‘posthuman 
security’ can take in its impulse to explore the intersections of humans and 
the diverse, transforming worlds we help to constitute. The strength of this 
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discourse is that it places both of its key terms – ‘posthumanism’ and 
‘security’ – in constant question, and stubbornly refuses closure into any 
particular vision of either. Indeed, although I have outlined some of the 
currents of this discussion so far, and some future paths it might follow, the 
conversation remains open to new and different ideas, critiques, interventions 
and futures. My account of these discourses should not be misconstrued as 
an ‘expert’ attempt to define them. Instead, these are the reflections of a 
participant-observer in an ongoing conversation that, I hope, will continue to 
create controversy, provoke arguments, frustrate academic expectations, 
spark collaborations and engender plural visions. Consider this your invitation 
to join us. 
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Between Radical Posthumanism 
and Weak Anthropocentrism: 
The Spectrum of Critical 
Humanism(s)
CAROLIN KALTOFEN
The increasing relevance of and interest in contending philosophies of 
materiality, often referred to as posthuman literature such as vital materialism, 
have inspired different strands of posthuman and post-anthropocentric 
thinking across the social sciences. In IR most of the posthuman issues, 
albeit not always labelled as such, are investigated under the analytic banner 
of speculative/new materialism, which increasingly makes reference to the 
‘posthuman’.2 In this paper I explore different conceptions and uses of the 
posthuman in International Relations (IR). While the notion of the posthuman 
leads to fascinating new approaches to the dynamics of the international, this 
recent theoretical turn, especially the ways in which new materialist 
philosophies as an instance of the posthuman have been adopted in IR, is 
problematic due to its incoherence and ambiguity as a scholarship, discourse 
and concept. The overall engagement with these notional difficulties 
underlying the posthuman project leads to the suggestion that 
posthumanism(s) in IR ‘is in fact weak anthropocentrism’ (Mitchell 2014, 6).
Approaching Posthuman Dialogues
In order to understand the development of posthuman ideas in IR, it is 
2  Prominent scholars working in this area are for example Diana Coole (2010), 
William Connolly (2011), Erika Cudworth and Stephen Hobden (2011), Audra Mitchell 
(2014) and Mike Bourne (2012).
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necessary to distinguish between posthuman accounts in IR that draw on 
contemporary ‘posthuman’ philosophy and the latter philosophical works 
themselves. In broad strokes, primary philosophical investigations, which 
conceptualise life differently to the predominant humanist metaphysics, 
suggest that thinking beyond the human (as a species, as a body and as a 
subject) and its primacy in our conception and treatment of the world and the 
life unfolding within it, marks a fundamental break from previous 
understandings of being and practices of ‘theoretical reason [that] is concept-
bound’ (Braidotti 2002, 2). While there are other factors that specify this new 
‘post’, the two main characteristics of this turn are arguably ontological and 
epistemic. The ontological effort lies in acknowledging that the human may 
not be human after all, which calls to re-think existence and being in the 
world. The consequence is epistemic because if we assume that our being 
and becoming is different from what we previously thought (given that we are 
likely to be implicated in a posthuman life), we can no longer explain how we 
experience and think in conventional epistemological terms. Questioning the 
human body and subject far beyond its discursive and performative 
construction topples centuries of epistemological beliefs, triggering powerful 
theoretical resonances. Chasing the posthuman reveals a world that is 
entirely different to the one we know and have studied so far (Rutsky 2007). 
At least this is how the argument goes. In this sense, the enquiry into a 
posthuman condition is to revisit the very make-up and function of the world 
and life. 
By reviewing different posthuman attempts, it becomes clear that there are 
various levels of posthuman-ness depending on the degree to which each 
conceptualisation strays away, indeed undermines, the human as a separate 
and independent form of life. Work by philosophers such as Gilles Deleuze 
and Manuel DeLanda inform the more radical end of the spectrum where 
bodies are not bound by skin, but rather flows of affect and intensities; where 
thought is not human in its origin, but non-local and pre-subjective, thereby 
toppling ideas of human consciousness and agency (DeLanda 1992; Deleuze 
2001). A body and a life are mere material processes of self-emergence and 
self-organisation including a wide range of organic and non-organic materials. 
Generally speaking, the thought experiment of the posthuman seeks to undo 
the human category and conceive of being and becoming without reference to 
a human condition and Cartesian dualism. However, other understandings of 
the posthuman are less drastic and leave the physiological and neurological 
integrity of the human intact, representing the other end of the spectrum. The 
different degrees of posthuman-ness are rarely acknowledged and the 
majority of posthuman efforts in IR (may this be in security or other aspects of 
the political) are taking from the human-conservative end. However, the latter 
is problematic insofar as it is not quite clear why and how it is ‘posthuman’ at 
all. Furthermore, the emerging posthuman trend over the past years has lead 
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to a posthuman discourse and turn/scholarship that ‘comprises a rather 
heterogeneous and not always compatible set of theoretical positions’ 
(Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2015, 4). It appears that most ‘posthuman’ 
approaches are merely cases of criticising either the role of the human, 
humanism or anthropocentrism or a combination thereof, but not so much 
human being/being human itself. As such, I briefly outline six different ways 
asking about the human(ism) in order to show that merely criticising the 
human is not a full posthuman move, especially in consideration of much 
more uncompromising ideas of the posthuman. 
Different Traditions and Applications: Is the ‘warrant for the death of 
Man’ Posthumanism?
The increasing interdisciplinarity of academic practice makes it difficult to 
draw a clear distinction between materialist philosophies seeking to articulate 
a posthuman ontology and applications thereof in the social sciences, given 
that a considerable part of contemporary philosophy (especially continental 
philosophy) is happening across and between academic subjects. In this 
sense it is easier to approximate posthuman scholarship by distinguishing it 
from other works that problematise the givenness of the human. However, 
literature critical of the human or humanism in a conventional sense often 
work in different and unrelated ways and aspects. As elaborated in more 
detail below, voices critical of the human – which here are grouped together 
as critical humanism(s) for practical reasons – differ from each other and 
differ from posthuman ideas depending on the type of questions they are 
asking. Some strands are interested in problematising the role of the human 
in relation to other living beings and objects, while others are focused on the 
human body and subject in itself. Yet, the underlying assumption of ‘a human’ 
as a body and subject remains, so that it is only its dominance, self-alleged 
superiority, and privilege that needs to be corrected to include the previously 
marginalised (in which ever shape or form these appear). In light of this, the 
general argument is that while the criticism concerning the primacy of the 
human as a form of life and political actor is an important area of scholarship 
in and of itself, this is not always a posthuman effort as such. For example, 
criticising the centrality of the human in the theory and practice of security, is 
not a complete posthuman move. 
Criticising Static Bourgeois Man 
In the advent of critical humanism(s) – understood as different ways of asking 
about and challenging the human(ism) – one of the first ways in which the 
human came under scrutiny was regarding its assumed essence and its 
acclaimed dominant role in structuring/influencing life on earth (the epoch of 
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the anthropocene). Especially earlier critical humanism attacks humans’ 
primacy and supremacy through a logic of decentring man in the landscape of 
the anthropocene. Within this project of decentring, different attempts can be 
distinguished by the way in which they seek to remove the human from its 
dominant, centric position.3 This line of criticism disagrees with humanism’s 
essentialism that ignores (different aspects of) production, but not with the 
idea that there is an eventual end product of the human animal. Indeed, this 
criticism still holds that by looking at productive processes it is possible to 
‘find real men’ (Althusser 1976, 53). Hence, when located on the spectrum of 
posthuman-ness, this variant – often associated with Karl Marx’s historical 
materialism – falls short of a posthuman ontology and instead lays the 
foundations for the development of critical humanism.4
Criticising Static Binaries and the Big Ism
It can be argued that later posthuman work was inspired by early critical 
humanism, such as Marx’s historical materialism, that deconstructs man as 
an absolute departure point for political, historical, social and other enquiries. 
Questioning the role of the human (subject) in this way gained momentum as 
an intellectual project and agenda in the social sciences and continental 
philosophy, and we see two strands developing alongside and often in 
tandem with each other. One questions the centrality of the human at the 
level of the human and society, the other questions it at the level of humanity 
and intellectual traditions. Foucault’s proclamation of the end of man in The 
Order of Things gave rise to serious possibilities of further decentring the 
human and, eventually, to deconstruct it as the main political and security 
referent. It meant that the human and in particular man was no longer treated 
as the measure of all things and used as the structuring device of, for 
example, society, politics or history (Braidotti 2013, 23); which differs from the 
way in which Marx sought to dismantle the primacy of man. Subsequent post-
anthropocentric development in the Twentieth Century can be observed to 
occur at two levels: 1) at the level of biopolitics where the concern is with 
binaries and dichotomies, which focused on the displacement and blurring of 
boundaries that are routinely used in order to normalise, nationalise, gender, 
sex, globalise, or otherwise discipline living and nonliving bodies;5 and 2) at 
the level of intellectual history as a more abstract and general critique, 
attacking conventional humanism as an intellectual practice itself for it 
maintains and furthers the awe of human superiority (based on its ability to 
3  As seen in the works of Karl Marx and Louis Althusser, for example. 
4  Nonetheless, this intellectual tradition initiates a decentring of the human from the 
centre of history and as its driving force by looking at other constitutive processes of 
the social.
5  As seen in Judith Butler’s work, for example.
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reason and to act morally and ethically), the human as moving towards 
perfection, and the normalcy this takes in explaining and justifying intellectual 
traditions. With regard to the first strand, it can be argued that decentring the 
human by blurring its own and other boundaries does not suggest a full 
posthuman ontology, but a type of critical human(ism) that is androgynous 
and hybrid. Rather than suggesting a posthuman alternative in a strict sense, 
this move offered the opportunity to open up spaces at the margins and those 
previously outside in our study of the international, challenging the ways in 
which we have written and have been written as privileged, whole and 
gendered humans into a binary and dichotomised world. Turning to the 
second type, then we are dealing with a decentring of the human from its 
privileged position through the vigorous critique on the entire phenomenon of 
the Western Canon, Enlightenment and modern philosophical practices. This 
variant seeks to undermine the rational human and to rid philosophy of ‘all the 
“Humanist” rubbish that is brazenly being dumped into it’ (Althusser quoted in 
Badmington 2004, 41). Yet, critique here is still pitched in terms of human 
phenomena embedded in a correlationist framework.6 Sceptics articulate their 
criticism in reference to the humanist orbit and human limits, connecting their 
analysis to the human experience.7 Given this, it would be a stretch to 
consider this type of critical humanism a form of posthumanism in the radical 
sense.
Cyborgs: An Ultrahuman Manifesto
Nonetheless, all three versions of re-structuring the landscape and epoch of 
the human significantly influenced the study of IR. And so the critical 
humanism of the postmodern was the ideal breeding ground for posthuman 
trends and discourse in the age of scientific and technological acceleration 
that fuelled debates about the abilities and limits of the human organism. The 
advance and availability of technology lead to question not only the status of 
reality, but also that of the human itself. Technology’s increasing ubiquity in 
the Western way of life meant that the human body and subject got blended 
and mended with its supposedly non-natural environment. Depending on 
what technological determinism one subscribes to (whether instrumentalism 
or essentialism)8 the body is either technologically extended, enhanced and 
6  Quentin Meillassoux’s explanation of correlationism holds that in a dualist 
understanding humans exist as sentient and cognisant beings-in-the-world, where it is 
impossible to speak about the world ‘independent of thought or language’ (Moulard-
Leonard 2008, 4).
7  As seen in Foucault’s discussions of power and discursive structures, Lacan’s 
analysis of the signifier and the real as well as Derrida’s discussions of the play of the 
signifier and the trace, and albeit to a lesser extent, Luhmann’s work on social systems 
as communication systems (Bryant 2010).  
8  For more see for example Daniel McCarthy’s ‘Technology and ‘the International’ or: 
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upgraded, or invaded and under attack. However, as R.L. Rutsky notes ‘there 
is, in fact, nothing inherently posthuman about technological or genetic 
enhancements of the human body’ as these approaches still start with human 
as the point-zero of departure. Furthermore, the dominance of the subject 
remains and it is only the boundaries of its body that is tampered with. 
Indeed, the cyborg and its technologically enhanced humanity is a 
reinforcement of the human and humanism 2.0. As tempting as it is to take 
the neuromancing cyborg as an icon of post-anthropocentrism, the form of life 
it describes is far removed from the posthuman in the initial philosophical 
sense.
More-than-Humans and Species Egalitarianism
Posthuman debates in IR, especially in security studies, are often associated 
with the increased impetus to go beyond the human in terms of species and 
to include non-human animals, living organisms and other organic 
components of our ecosystem into the analysis. These are dominant trends in 
critical ecology, animal studies and environmentalism that speak of non-
humans, ‘earthlings’ and earth-others, and who thereby reject self-centred 
individualism.9 The motivation of the more-than-human approach, especially 
as adopted in IR, is focused on the lively aspects of all beings, including our 
natural and non-natural environment (Cudworth and Hobden 2013). This 
scholarship frequently conceives of threats to other living things on earth as a 
security issue. While the more-than-human camp is hugely diverse, a large 
part of its posthuman inspired thought is an attack on ‘the fundamental 
anthropological dogma associated with humanism’ of the humanity/animality 
dichotomy whereby the human escaped its animal and barbaric origin by 
dominating nature, transcending immediate instinctual and material needs 
(Wolfe 2010, xiv). Whereas the initial idea is to extend concerns beyond the 
human, the way this has often been adopted in IR is through the implicit 
inversion of this logic. To justify various agendas of environmental politics by 
arguing that human wellbeing depends on it, given our permeability to an 
increasingly toxic and dangerous environment, is not a posthuman argument, 
but a humanist one. In this sense, more-than-human approaches aspiring the 
posthuman need to be distinguished carefully on the basis of differing 
motivations as to why we care in the first place.10 Comparing this approach 
with other decentring and posthuman tendencies, then IR’s more-than-human 
adaptations are neither strictly posthuman nor do they describe a species or 
ecological egalitarianism as such, but develop a rationale whereby the human 
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Determinism’ (2013).
9  See for example Cudworth and Hobden (2011).
10  See Audra Mitchell’s (2014) initial assessment of different types of more-than-
human and only human motivations.  
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existence is protected. This creates an altogether new and peculiar kind of 
‘liberal’ humanism that highlights interdependence, connectedness and 
mutual vulnerability.
Things and Stuff: Object Oriented Ontology
Trying to think as objects, how they relate to each other and imagining the 
world from the view point of objects is fundamental to the development of a 
post-anthropocentric thought. Ensuing from the criticism on the persistence of 
humanism and the human subject (even if hybridised and pluralised) we see 
the movement of object oriented philosophy emerging (or OOO). Prominent 
scholars in this field are, for example, Graham Harman (2003), Levi Bryant 
(2011) and Ian Bogost (2012) who address precisely the continuation of the 
subject-object division in the previous attempts of overcoming humanist 
biases. In general, the OOO proposition is that we need to stop trying to 
understand the world in terms of subject-object relations. In this sense, rather 
than analysing phenomena in this dynamic – between the human and 
environment, human and animal or human and technology – perhaps the 
things going on independently of that, meaning the action of and between 
objects, are much more interesting and revealing. Disrupting this dynamic 
also means that it is no longer the conscious human subject that accesses 
the world through sensual perception and makes sense of it with its rational 
mind. Out of the various ‘other’-human scholarship OOO has been of 
particular importance in posthuman debates in IR; a substantial amount of 
literature takes inspiration from this philosophical tradition focusing on agentic 
structures and objects by analysing the flows of commodities, weapons, illicit 
drugs or the lively aspects of borders, passports, printers and so on.11 To 
argue that this standpoint seeks a posthuman condition as such seems far-
stretched, given that it is primarily concerned with displacing human 
experience from the centre of IR and security, but remains largely silent over 
matters of alternatives to the (form of) existence of human beings.
Ultimately, analysing and situating the six variants on the spectrum of 
posthuman-ness calls into question whether posthuman IR is actually 
posthuman as none of IR’s posthumanesque disquisitions develop an 
ontology of the international that is based on a form of life that is distinctly 
and clearly posthuman. Thus, the current state of posthuman IR and security 
is better described as that of different, less-anthropocentric world views, 
many of which do not speak to each other because they are in fact emerging 
from different ontological premises. Rather than being able to escape the all-
11  See for example Mike Bourne (2012), Kathy Ferguson (2014) and Mark Salter 
(2012).
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too-human focus of IR, the different posthuman efforts rearticulate humanism 
in a way that is contemporary, more egalitarian, inclusive, less dogmatic and 
worldly. In short, it can be argued that IR’s current posthuman touch is only a 
neo-humanist modification rather than a posthuman position.
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Hybridity and Humility: What 
of the Human in Posthuman 
Security?
ELKE SCHWARZ
Thinking about ‘posthuman security’ is no easy task. To begin with, it requires 
a clear notion of what we mean by ‘posthuman’. There are various projects 
underway to understand what this term can or should signal, and what it 
ought to comprise. To bring a broadened understanding of ‘security’ into the 
mix complicates matters further. In this essay, I argue that a focus on the 
relation of the human to new technologies of war and security provides one 
way in which IR can fruitfully engage with contemporary ideas of 
posthumanism.
For Audra Mitchell (2014) and others, ‘posthuman security’ serves as a broad 
umbrella term, under which various non-anthropocentric approaches to 
thinking about security can be gathered. Rather than viewing security as a 
purely human good or enterprise, ‘posthuman’ thinking instead stresses the 
cornucopia of non-human and technological entities that shape our political 
ecology, and, in turn, condition our notions of security and ethics. For Mitchell 
(2014), this process comprises machines, ecosystems, networks, non-human 
animals, and ‘complex assemblages thereof’. Sounds clear enough, but this 
is where things begin to get complicated.
First, what exactly is ‘post’ about the posthuman? Often lumped in together 
under the category of ‘posthumanism’ are ideas of transhumanism, anti-
humanism, post-anthropocentrism, and speculative posthumanism (see for 
instance David Roden 2015).12 Each variant has different implications for how 
12  Roden engages with the various discourses on ‘posthumanism’ today, going to 
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we think ‘security’ and ‘ethics’ after, or indeed beyond, the human. 
Furthermore, one must ask whether it is even possible to use concepts of 
security, ethics, and politics after, or beyond the human. These concepts are 
not only deeply entwined with social constructs; they are also fundamentally 
human constructs. To think ‘after-the-human’ may well then render ‘security’ 
or ‘ethics’ as concepts entirely obsolete, or at the very least deprive them of a 
clear referent. And as if this was not enough to wrap one’s head around, we 
further may need to clarify whether it is post-humanity or post-humanness we 
aim to understand when we strive to think beyond the human. It appears, 
then, that the posthuman turn in security studies risks raising more questions 
than it helps to answer at this stage. A clarification of how these terms are 
used in the literature is thus necessary.
To date, the most clearly defined strands of posthumanist discourse are 
‘critical posthumanism’ and ‘transhumanism’, as elaborated in the work of 
Donna Haraway, Neil Badmington, Ray Kurzweil, and Nick Bostrom, among 
others. Both discourses, although very different in their approach and focus, 
posit a distinctly modern transformation through which human life has 
become more deeply enmeshed in science and technology than ever before. 
In this biologically informed techno-scientific context, human and machine 
have become isomorphic. The two are fused in both functional and 
philosophical terms, with technologies shaping human subjectivity as much as 
human subjectivities shape technology. The question of technology has thus, 
as Arthur Kroker (2014) puts it, become a question of the human. The 
question of the human, however, looks decidedly different when viewed 
through modern techno-scientific logics of functionality and performance. 
From this perspective, which promotes homogeneity, reproduction, 
replacement and prophylaxis as a means for the ‘technological purification of 
bodies,’ the human appears in ever more degraded terms, as a failure to live 
up to the promises of technology itself (Baudrillard 1993, 68). The greater the 
technological augmentation and alterations of life, and the more we invest in 
technological prostheses and substitutes for it, the greater becomes the 
necessity for humans to submit to the superiority of the artificial proxy, which 
carries within it a technologically informed ordering principle that remakes 
society in its own image. Thus, as contemporary life becomes ever more 
digitally mediated and technologically enhanced, the human appears more 
and more as a weak link in the human-machine chain – inadequate at best, 
‘an infantile malady of a technological apparatus’ at worst (Baudrillard 2016, 
20).
great lengths to highlight the differences between various kinds of ideas that are 
attached to the term. While these are relevant in the wider context of this article, I lack 
the space to engage with them in full here. 
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The interplay between man and machine has, of course, a long-standing 
history that can easily be conceived of in posthuman terms. This history 
suggests, in contrast to the rash of hysteric pronouncements about the 
novelty of our times, that we have always already been technologically 
enhanced and conditioned. I would concur with this point, but see it as doing 
little to undermine the importance of thinking the human-machine question 
anew, especially in light of the rapid proliferation and deployment of new 
technologies related to the waging of wars and the ordering and securing of 
populations and bodies. In such a context, it is necessary to identify and 
indeed challenge our submission to technological authority in social and 
political domains. If we take seriously that new technologies (as artefacts and 
practices) constitute ‘hegemonic political values and beliefs’ (Ansorge 2016, 
14), then we ought to first question the rationales that are given for such 
technologies. In particular, we must puncture the pervasive ideology of 
progress, which says that these new technologies are simply a motor behind 
the movement toward ever-greater levels of autonomy and artificial 
intelligence. The rapid movement towards greater autonomy in military affairs 
itself entails another process, which is the reconfiguration of new machine-
humans for a transformed ethos for the administration of war. It is therefore 
crucial, at least from a critical perspective, to get a handle on the kind of 
machine-human subjectivities our new ways of war and security are 
producing. 
In a fervent drive for progress, scientists and roboticists work feverishly to 
replace what we hitherto have known and understood as human life with 
bigger, better, bolder robot versions of what life ought to be – fully 
acknowledging, if not embracing, the possibility of rendering humans 
increasingly obsolete. Machines are designed to outpace human capabilities, 
while old-fashioned human organisms cannot progress at an equal rate and 
will, eventually, ‘clearly face extinction’ (Singer 2009, 415). Fears about this 
trajectory are being voiced by elites and experts of all stripes. Technology 
tycoon Elon Musk, for example, has recently issued a dire warning about the 
dangers of rapidly advancing Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the prospects of 
killer robots capable of ‘deleting humans like spam’ (in Anderson 2014). Musk 
is not alone in his cautious assessment. Nick Bostrom (2015), in a recent UN 
briefing, echoes such sentiments when he warns that AI may well pose the 
greatest existential risk to humanity today, if current developments are any 
indication of what is likely to come in the future. A group of 3037 AI/Robotics 
researchers has signed an open letter calling for a ban of autonomous 
weapons. The letter was signed by a further 17376 endorsers, among them 
Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, Steve Wozniak and Daniel C. Dennett. Other 
science and technology icons, like Bill Gates, have joined the chorus too, 
seeing new combinations of AI and advanced robotics as a grave source of 
insecurity going forward.
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Statements like these betray not only a certain fatalism on the part of humans 
who have, in fact, invented, designed, and realised said autonomous 
machines; they also pose the question of whether the advancement of 
technology can indeed still be considered a human activity, or whether 
technology itself has moved into a sphere beyond human control and 
comprehension. Humans, as conceived by transhumanist discourses, are 
involved in a conscious process of perpetually overcoming themselves 
through technology. For transhumanists, the human is ‘a work-in-progress,’ 
perpetually striving toward perfection in a process of techno-scientifically 
facilitated evolution that promises to leave behind the ‘half-baked 
beginning[s]’ of contemporary humanity (Bostrom 2005, 4). Transhumanism, 
however, is – as David Roden (2015, 13-14) points out – underwritten by a 
drive to improve and better human life. It is, he notes, a fundamentally 
normative position, whereby the freedom to self-design through technology is 
affirmed as an extension of human freedom. Transhumanism ‘is thus an 
ethical claim to the effect that technological enhancement of human 
capacities is a desirable aim’ (Roden 2015, 9). However, the pursuit of 
transhumanism through AI, the ‘NBIC’ suite of technologies (which comprises 
of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and the cognitive 
sciences), or networked computing technologies more generally does not 
guarantee a privileged place for humans in the historical future. Rather, the 
ongoing metamorphosis of human and machine threatens ‘an explosion of 
artificial intelligence that would leave humans cognitively redundant’ (Roden 
2015, 21). In such a scenario, the normative position of transhumanism 
necessarily collapses into a speculative view on the posthuman, wherein both 
the shape of the historical future and the place of the human within this 
become an open question. Indeed, in the future world there may be no place 
for the human at all.
This perhaps unintended move toward a speculative technological future 
harbours a paradox. First, the conception of science and technology as 
improving or outmoding the human is an inherently human construct and 
project – it is neither determined nor initiated by a non-human entity which 
demands or elicits submission based on their philosophical autonomy; rather, 
it is through human thought and imagination that this context emerges in the 
first place. The human is thus always already somehow immanent in the 
technological post-human. Yet at the same time, it is the overcoming, at the 
risk outmoding, human cognition and functionality that forms the basic wager 
of speculative posthumanism.13 Thus, while the posthuman future will be a 
13  At this point we can clarify the differences between humanism, transhumanism, 
posthumanism, and the posthuman. By ‘humanism’ I mean those discourses and 
projects that take some fixed idea of the human as their natural centre, and by 
‘transhumanism’ I mean those that grapple with or aim at an active technical alteration 
of the human as such. I reserve the term ‘posthumanism’ for those discourses that seek 
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product of human enterprise, it will also be a future in which the 
unaugmented human appears more and more as flawed, error-prone, and 
fallible. Contemporary techno-enthusiasm therefore carries within it the seeds 
of our anxiety, shame, and potential obsolescence as ‘mere humans’.
This new hierarchical positioning of the human vis-à-vis technology 
represents a shift in both. Put simply, the ‘creator’ of machines accepts a 
position of inferiority in relation to his or her creations (be these robots, 
cyborgs, bionic limbs, health apps, or GPS systems, to give just a few 
examples). This surrender relies on an assumed techno-authority of 
produced ‘life’ on the one hand, and an acceptance of inferiority – as an 
excess of the human’s desire to ‘surpass man’, to become machine – on the 
other. The inherently fallible and flawed human can never fully-meet the 
standards of functionality and perfection that are the mandate for the 
machines they create. And it is precisely within this hybridity of being deity 
(producer) and mortal (un-produced human) that an unresolved tension 
resides. Heidegger’s student and Hannah Arendt’s first husband, Günther 
Anders, has given much thought to this. His work extensively grapples with 
the condition that characterises the switch from creator to creatum, and he 
diagnoses this distinctly modern condition as one of ‘Promethean Shame.’ It 
is the very technologisation of our being that gives rise to this shame, which 
implies a shamefulness about not-being-machine, encapsulating both awe at 
the superior qualities of machine existence, and admiration for the flawless 
perfection with which machines promise to perform specific roles or tasks. In 
this distinctly modern condition, human worth and moral standards are 
measured against the parameters of rational and flawlessly functioning 
machines, producing a normed environment in which the human cannot fully 
fit in. To overcome this shame, Anders argues, humans began to enhance 
their biological capacities, striving to make themselves more and more like 
machines. 
The concept of shame is significant not simply as ‘overt shame’ – which is 
akin to a ‘feeling experienced by a child when it is in some way humiliated by 
another person’ (Giddens 2003, 65) – but also as an instantiation of being 
exposed as insufficient, flawed, or erroneous. This latter form of shame is 
concerned with ‘the body in relation to the mechanisms of self-identity’ 
(Giddens 2003, 67), and is intrinsically bound up with the modern human-
technology complex. To compensate, adapt to, and fit into a technologized 
environment, humans seek to become machines through technological 
enhancement, not merely to better themselves, but also to meet the quasi-
to think a future in which the technical alteration of the human has given rise to new 
forms of life that can no longer properly be called human. The ‘posthuman’ is a name 
for these new, unknown forms of life.
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moral mandate of becoming a rational and progressive product: ever-better, 
ever-faster, ever-smarter, superseding the limited corporeality of the human, 
and eventually the human self. This mandate clearly adheres to a capitalist 
logic, shaping subjectivities in line with a drive toward expansion and 
productivity. It is, however, a fundamentally technological drive insofar as 
functionality per se, rather than expansion or productivity, is the measure of 
all. Nowhere is this more starkly exemplified than in current relations between 
human soldiers and unmanned military technology. 
Consider, for example, military roboticist Ronald Arkin’s conviction that the 
human is the weakest link in the kill chain. Such a logos – which is derived 
from the efficient and functional character as technology as such – suggests 
that the messy problems of war and conflict can be worked away through the 
abstract reasoning of machines. Arkin (2015), one of the most vocal 
advocates of producing ‘ethical’ lethal robots by introducing an ‘ethical 
governor’ into the technology, inadvertently encapsulates both aspects of 
techno-authority perfectly when he asks: ‘Is it not our responsibility as 
scientists to look for effective ways to reduce man’s inhumanity to man 
through technology?’ For Arkin, the lethal robot is able to make a more ethical 
decision than the human, simply by being programmed to a use a pathway for 
decision-making based on abstracted laws of war and armed conflict. The 
human, in her flawed physiological and mental capacity, is thus to be 
governed by the (at least potential) perfection of a machine authority. 
This is by no means a mere brainchild of outsider techno-enthusiasm – quite 
the contrary: the US Department of Defense (DoD) is an active solicitor of 
increasingly intelligent machines that, one day soon, will be able to ‘select 
and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator,’ and will 
possess the reasoning capacity needed to ‘assess situations and make 
recommendations or decisions,’ including, most likely, kill decisions 
(Zacharias 2015). Consider, for example, the DoD Autonomy Roadmap, 
presented in March 2015, which sets out the agenda for greater levels of 
machine intelligence and learning (MPRI), as well as rational goals for 
human-machine interactions and collaboration (HASIC), and a concept of 
‘Calibrated Trust’ intended to create for the human an understanding of ‘what 
the [machine] agent is doing and why’ (Bornstein 2015). With the drive for 
greater technology autonomy comes the apparent desire for greater 
technology authority. ‘Human-autonomy teaming’ is a partnership in which the 
human, at least ostensibly, still decides when and how to invoke technology’s 
autonomy (Endsley 2015). Whether this is possible or even realistic in 
contexts, such as those where humans lack the sensory capabilities or 
computing powers required for the task they are undertaking, is very much a 
question that needs asking. Particularly as on a not-too-distant horizon looms 
the spectre of intelligent machine autonomy, equipped with superior sensors, 
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agility, and reasoning capacities. The hierarchies of authority over the most 
morally challenging of decisions, such as killing in war, are likely to 
experience a shift overall toward a pure techno-logos. 
Leaving the heated debate about Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 
(LAWS) – or Killer Robots – aside for a moment, this logic is testament to the 
Promethean Shame identified by Anders half a century prior. In his writings, 
Anders astutely realised the ethical implications of such a shift in hierarchical 
standing. As Christopher Müller notes in his discussion of Anders’ work, the 
contemporary world is one in which machines are ‘taking care’ of both 
functional problems as well as fundamentally existential questions; ‘[i]t is 
hence the motive connotations of taking care to relieve of worry, responsibility 
and moral effort that are of significance here’ (Müller  2015). It is in such a 
shift toward a techno-authority that ethical responsibility is removed from the 
human realm and conceived of instead in techno-scientific terms. Ethics as a 
technical matter ‘mimes scientific analysis; both are based on sound facts and 
hypothesis testing; both are technical practices’ (Haraway 1997, 109). Arkin’s 
argument for the inclusion of an ethics component in military robots is 
paradigmatic. In his understanding of ethics, Arkin (2015) frames the logical 
coding of robotic machines as ethically superior to the human – indeed, he 
calls the module an ‘ethical governor.’ The rationale underpinning this position 
takes for granted a number of things. One is that the human can, and indeed 
must, be measured against the technology to assess her functional 
performance. Another is that the characteristics of those who pose a risk to 
security can clearly be ascertained and acted on within this techno-logos. 
And finally, it is assumed that this reasoning is rational and consistent and 
therefore moral. Together these turn ethics into a task of identifying and 
eliminating persons of risk as humanely as possible, and with as few people’s 
lives on the line as technology can permit. The underlying question, then, 
shifts from whether it is ethical to kill, to whether technological systems would 
do the killing better than humans. If it has been determined by algorithmic 
calculation, for example, that all military-aged males in a certain geographic 
region, displaying certain suspicious patterns of life behaviour, pose a 
potential security risk, then the ethical task at hand is to kill better and more 
humanely. The ‘ethical’ dimension of a kill decision is thereby engineered into 
a technological system, so that the actual moment of a real ethical decision is 
always already pre-empted and thereby eliminated. Where ethics is 
abstracted and coded, it leaves us with little possibility to challenge the 
ethicality of the context within which the ethical programme unfolds. And 
where ethics is coded, it curbs the ethical responsibility of the individual 
subject. I address this problem of a scientifically informed rationale of ethics 
as a matter of technology elsewhere (see for instance Schwarz 2015). What I 
would like to stress here, though, are the possible futures associated with this 
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trajectory. 
The speculative nature of posthumanism requires that we creatively imagine 
how traditional concepts of humanity, such as ethics or security, might 
comprehensively be affected and altered by technology. In other words, the 
rise (and fall) of homo technologicus requires that we address the question 
concerning technology imaginatively. A challenge in modern thinking about 
technology was and still is the apparent gap between the technologies we 
produce and our imagination regarding the uses to which this technology is 
put. Here, I return to Günther Anders. For Anders (1972), this is a gap 
between product and mind, between the production (Herstellung) of 
technology and our imagination (Vorstellung) regarding the consequences of 
its use. Letting this gap go unaddressed produces space for a technological 
authority to emerge, wherein ethical questions are cast in increasingly 
technical terms. This has potentially devastating implications for ethics as 
such. As Anders notes, the discrepancy between Herstellung and Vorstellung 
signifies that we no longer know what we do. This, in turn, takes us to the 
very limits of our responsibility, for ‘to “assume responsibility” is nothing other 
than to admit to one’s deed, the effects of which one had conceived 
(vorgestellt) in advance’ (Anders 1972, 73-74). And what becomes of ethics, 
when we can no longer claim any responsibility? 
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Anthropocentrism and the 
Politics of the Living
RAFI YOUATT
The ‘end of nature’ has been widely proclaimed. At one level, it refers to the 
ongoing biophysical destruction of ecosystems, habitats, forests, species, 
individual creatures, and climate through widely varying processes of 
extraction, consumption, and production. But at another level, it also 
references the end of a particularly western idea of nature, as something 
external to human politics, economy, and culture (Latour 2004). Such an idea 
of nature, in which the non-human world was largely taken as a form of 
‘standing reserve’ for state extraction (Smith 2009), was central to the 
development of the contemporary state system under which the first, material 
end of nature proceeded, undergirding projects of colonialism and capitalism. 
In this context, the long, slow crisis of biodiversity loss marks a double end of 
nature. The daily extinction of species, the general homogenization of 
species around the world, and the transformation of terrestrial and marine 
ecosystems, all due to human activity, all point to an end of material nature. 
Biodiversity loss, along with climate change, thus form some of the key 
conditions for the so-called Anthropocene – an era marked by deep human 
intervention into the deepest processes of nature. Nature, if it ever was 
external, is no longer so, and neither political practice nor political thought 
can rely on it quite so easily.
One reading of the relative lack of scientific knowledge about most species, 
and the general lack of world political attention paid to this crisis, is that 
nature is being extinguished before humans even know about it.14 Moreover, 
14  Thanks are due to the participants in the Global Politics without Ignorance 
Workshop, held in October 2016 at the New School for Social Research. The 
discussion there informs a number of points in this article.
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even if we were to know more, we might not care. But this reading, while true 
in one sense, is also misleading. Non-human life has in many ways been one 
of the most intensively studied aspects of various political projects, ranging 
from colonial preoccupations with biology, species, collection and cataloguing, 
to the deep forms of knowledge and manipulation generated through 
contemporary global agricultural practices, to the forms of nature that are 
being produced in the Anthropocene not by neglect or distance but by deep, 
thorough-going intervention in nature. So a tempting way to think 
anthropocentrism and global politics – as a full, wilful blindness about non-
human life – doesn’t seem to be entirely right. 
And yet, as Audra Mitchell (2016a) contends, not only is there an enormous 
blind spot about biodiversity loss, in the sense of political awareness about 
extinction, but this blind spot is produced through structural conditions of 
knowledge production. This is not just the natural sciences failing to complete 
their cumulative processes of collecting information, but also social sciences, 
including IR, failing to contemplate the challenges of planet politics (Burke et 
al. 2016). There are also blind spots when it comes to the ways in which we 
think about international politics and non-human life and persons, and in 
particular around the question of who or what can be seen as a political actor. 
Central to this blind spot are formations of anthropocentrism.
Anthropocentrism is a difficult term, given that it is not always entirely clear 
what constitutes the ‘anthropos’ or ‘the human’, nor is it clear what it means 
for such an entity to be ‘centred’. I use it as a rather large term to cover a 
range of perspectives that in some way trouble the exclusive centrality of the 
human to our concepts and analyses of political life, and call into question 
that category of the human itself, prompting us to ask about multiple versions 
of the human articulated in and with different assemblages of the non-human, 
including animal, natural, material, and technological. Specifically, 
multispecies and multi-being assemblages, I suggest by the end of the article, 
may be a more fundamental political unit of global politics than we have 
previously tended to assume in IR.
There are also blind spots in anti-anthropocentric thought, when it comes to 
their own conception of the human, who sometimes paradoxically re-emerges 
as a universal figure, defined by species rather than history, carrying moral 
capacities to order and re-order the world. At the ‘end of nature,’ such a 
version of the human is regularly being articulated in global environmental 
discourses, such as climate change and Anthropocene, which in many ways 
do aim to reorient our understandings of what international relations is for. 
Such claims miss the historical responsibility of some humans over others; 
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they underrate the specific structuring forces of colonialisms, capitalisms, and 
geopolitics, rather than species activity; and the historical and cultural human, 
rather than the biological human.
This article first suggests that any significant evaluation of anthropocentrism 
requires a critical engagement with the anthropos, or the human that is 
presumed to be at the centre of anthropocentrism, and it requires 
engagements with the specific ways that nonhuman life figures in these 
productions as well as on their own terms. The second part of the article 
suggests some of the pathways that such an analysis opens for IR, engaging 
both with interspecies relations and logics, and with the politics of collective 
personhood.
Anthropocentrism 
What I want to do first is to map some of the critiques that work around 
anthropocentrism, and then move to an analysis of the important problematics 
that they open up for global politics. One general way that anthropocentrism 
is approached in global politics is as a matter of moral or ethical privileging of 
the human, as more important than various figurations of non-humans – 
whether nature or nonhuman animals.15 Here, the critique is that humans 
have unfairly, or unwittingly, privileged their moral standing over non-human 
life, which has been reduced to some form of purely instrumental use. In 
environmental ethics, then, the response to this kind of anthropocentrism has 
been to discuss alternative subjects of moral value, such as biocentrism, in 
which all forms of life share in some form of value, or ecocentrism, putting 
ecosystems front and centre.
One of the most powerful aspects of this critique has been to show that 
anthropocentrism is not, as some assert, a problem that is inherent to being 
human – one is not inherently anthropocentric by being human. Rather, like 
other systems of moral value, it is possible to imagine other systems of moral 
value. The downsides, though, are twofold: first, such moves reinscribe the 
idea of a morally reasoning human subject as the arbiter of value, which 
seems to come full circle to the very problem it is trying to avoid. It removes 
us from the pull and push of the places where responses-among-and-
between living creatures plays out, or where relations of ‘response-ability,’ as 
Haraway (2008) puts it, play out. Second, by staying largely on moral and 
ethical terrain, it also avoids the difficult questions about how such value 
systems play out in political practice. While this is not a failing of moral theory, 
per se, it does limit its utility in aiming to understand contemporary political 
15  These points are explored in greater depth in (Youatt 2014). On ecocentrism and 
international relations, see the pioneering work of Robyn Eckersley (2004)
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ecological formations.
Rather than moral valuation then, other work has pushed us significantly to 
think about the analysis of global politics from a less anthropocentric 
perspective. Here, rather than assuming human beings to be the sole agents 
and authors of political events – whether as intentional agents, or as the 
bearers of social structures, social meanings, and discourses – a more 
careful, non-anthropocentric analysis of political life would reveal those 
accounts to be fictions that bury many forms of nonhuman agency under 
ideas like ‘unintentional consequences’ or ‘structural constraint’ or, in fact, 
ignored entirely. Instead, as Timothy Mitchell (2002) puts it in his seminal 
chapter in Rule of Experts, it means making agency a question to be pursued, 
rather than one to be answered in advance.
This empirical multiplication of political agency, at its best, shows not just a 
banal sense of causality through non-human materialities that intervene 
between human agents, but shows instead the specific kinds of differences 
that non-human entities make in particular political constellations (Robbins 
2007; Salter 2015). At times, this work also suggests that greater analytical 
attention to the networks of becoming that make up politics also entails a shift 
in our ethical perspective, or at least an openness to the world that is more 
likely to result in positive environmental outcomes. 
In its stronger guises, an analytical commitment against anthropocentrism 
involves an ontological argument, or a claim for what Jane Bennett (2001, 
160-66), following Stephen White, calls ‘weak ontology.’ Much of Bruno 
Latour’s work (Latour 1993; 2004) also functions in this space – advancing 
neither a moral claim, per se, nor a political claim about particular 
assemblages over, against, or with others, but rather a more general 
ontological claim about the way the world works across the Great Divides of 
nature, culture, using specific cases as examples.
But there is a missing element in this analytical anti-anthropocentrism when it 
does not directly call into question the production of the multiple humans in 
anthropocentrism – that is, in focusing its attention on non-human actants, it 
sometimes assumes (tacitly, at least) that the ‘human’ in anthropocentrism is 
best described as a category encompassing the entire species, rather than 
asking how particular versions of the human come into being, and what the 
regimes of inclusion and exclusion are around those figures.16
A third engagement with anthropocentrism, then, moves directly into this 
16  Among those who have raised this issue are (Sundberg 2014)
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political space, to ask not only about moral questions of valuation, or 
empirical questions of distributed agency, but a number of political questions 
about hierarchy. It asks about the making of humanity as a category of 
practice – across lines of race (Anderson 2013), coloniality (Mavhunga 2011), 
migrants and borders (Sundberg 2011), war (Kosek 2011), humanitarianism 
(Ticktin 2011), and commodification (Tsing 2012). Anthropocentrism here is 
also a historically positioned ideology, working within circuits of colonialism, 
liberalism, and capitalism, but it works unevenly across place, space, and 
time. It is therefore more accurate to think about anthropocentrisms in the 
plural. 
Seeing anthropocentrisms as political ideologies does not mean solely 
approaching them through forms of critique. Rather, precisely the terms on 
which anthropocentrism is constituted – on human language and reason as 
the grounds of political belonging, for example – mask the many ways that 
‘non-linguistic’ activity already constitutes the political. This means a turn 
back to the areas on which the human is constituted – and here, it is useful to 
return to some of the moral and ontological critiques of humanism, but with a 
more political eye. For example, the divide between human and animal 
comes into view not just as one separating humans from non-human animals, 
but as a more general category of animality that structures life conditions for a 
range of creatures. It also means that a more thorough reading of the 
political, through non-anthropocentric lenses, means asking more fully about 
the ways we interact with non-human life as itself political – across the wide 
range of contexts in which that happens – and as worthy of our attention. 
So anthropocentrism in this particular sense – as a question of political 
ontology and historically positioned productions of differences in and across 
species lines – opens up a very fertile and important set of issues in global 
politics. Rather than looking at environmental issues solely as matters for 
human politics to sort out, for example, it asks us to look at intersections 
between them and the production of hierarchy through shifting categories of 
species, animal, living, and natural and through interactive practices among 
humans and other species. Rather than looking at questions around non-
human animals as a question of how far existing rights should be extended, it 
asks us to think about how concepts of animality function to structure the lives 
of both human and non-human lives. And rather than looking to move past the 
human or to transcend the human, it asks us to stay with the production of 
different kinds of humans as a question of political analysis.17
17  In many ways, this approach is not new – though it has been largely absent from 
Euro-American international relations. This work comes from anthropology, geography, 
political ecology, science studies, and elsewhere.
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Politics of the Living?
On one hand, I am particularly committed to understanding a politics of the 
living, moving slightly away from the analytic space of new materialisms. 
When materialisms become political, they often seem to reduce to a kind of 
weak anthropocentrism, where people are walking assemblages, and we care 
about the assemblages because we care about the people. But there is 
something important in the combination of a) the squishy, embodied fact of 
living bodies (Calarco 2008; Hayles 1999), and b) in particular about the 
interpretive moments that living beings share (Kohn 2013; Uexkull 1982), and 
c) the ways they increasingly seem to me to be enmeshed in a kind of 
biopolitics of the living, one that is both problematic in its effects, but 
promising in the resistant alliances it points to (Youatt 2008), and d) offers a 
potential for particular interspecies assemblages as politically salient (Tsing 
2012).
We could take this to be an opportunity to start to enquire about how 
particular productions of humanism work within a broader politics, practice, 
and symbolic economy of life. To take one example, at the US-Mexico border, 
I have been trying to understand the circulation of anthropocentrism, across 
species lines, and how this implies a sense of the political as something 
already involving multiple species – not in a benign sense of inclusion, but as 
a sometimes violent, exclusionary process that works alongside possibilities 
of affiliation, and companion species. Who counts as human, subhuman, 
animal, endangered, protected, and when? Ocelot politics involve an 
assemblage of endangerment: an endangered species in the US under the 
endangered species act (though ocelots fare much better in Central and 
South America), and discourses around endangered nation and culture; and 
endangerment that ocelots face trying to cross roads (the major source of 
death for ocelots in the region). Invasiveness, too, is a multispecies 
assemblage at the border: the invasive Nilgai antelope (brought from India to 
Texas for hunting purposes in the 1930s, and now largely feral), crossing into 
Mexico, and re-crossing a quarantine line designed to keep ticks bearing 
cattle fever out of American rangelands. This quarantine line runs parallel to 
the border, now with designed tactical infrastructure (the product of a limited 
wall-building project) designed to keep illegal immigrants out, or at least 
minimised. Invasiveness and endangerment, central to IR imaginaries around 
security, might be in this case best understood not as a discourse, nor as 
security facts, but as a multi-species and multi-practice assemblage.
What does it mean to elevate certain species over others, and sometimes for 
them to be elevated above other humans? In the most challenging vein of 
inquiry, what would it mean to start to think about politics as something 
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multiple communities of different species engage in – how does one research 
something like that as a matter of global politics? (In one sense, we already 
do, in any research involving claims about eco-systems, which are made up 
of living species interacting with one another, on and through various non-
living elements; why ecosystems and their constituent parts should remain off 
limits to IR is a mystery, given that this has been taken up by anthropologists, 
environmental studies, geographers, and others).
On the other hand, the analytics of new materialism have opened up the 
question of how apparently non-living, or abiotic things like mountains, 
canyons, buildings, IEDs and deserts, act on us, interact with, disrupt and 
make possible political life (Boyce 2015; Grove 2016; Salter 2015). But I am 
increasingly cognizant that my relationship with the non-living comes out of a 
particular kind of philosophy of life and nature (rooted in biological sciences), 
and a particular politics as well (secular). In my more recent research, I have 
become interested in how apparently non-living things, like mountains or 
ecosystems, are encountered by global governance, and what it means for 
them to be positioned as non-living. I have been particularly influenced by 
anthropological work, here including Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2004), 
Marisol de la Cadena (2010), and Eduardo Kohn (2013). This body of work 
pushes hard against my assumptions about the nature of the divide between 
the living and the non-living – what does it mean for Mt. Taylor in New Mexico 
to be a living being, for example, as asserted by Zuni tribes (Colwell and 
Ferguson 2014)? 
Recent efforts to use ‘sacred mountains’ as a new marker for setting areas of 
international conservation similarly highlight claims about the personhood of 
mountains. To take on example, Mt. Kailash (or Kangrinboque) in Tibetan 
China, draws pilgrims from Buddhist, Hindu, Bon (animist), and frequently, 
syncretic traditions, who come yearly for circumambulation. The site is also 
beginning to be developed by China and perhaps India and Nepal as a tourist 
destination, and there is potential for mineral resource extraction nearby. 
Each of these religious traditions work within worldviews in which Mt. Kailash 
is not a mountain per se, but a person or divinity who is enmeshed in a wide-
ranging set of relations that go beyond its geographic site, including social 
and ecological relations. While such personhoods are usually relegated to 
‘religious belief’ in secular politics, perhaps such framings are too biological in 
their limiting of living beings. Rather than resolve the question of what is living 
and what is not, it might be more important to understand the living in a more 
open fashion, and as itself a site of political contestation, sometimes in 
incommensurable ways. 
What do we make of multiple personhoods existing in the same place, then? 
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Can we mix the registers of collective state personhood with collective 
persons that are perhaps divinities or perhaps invoking nonhuman living 
beings? What happens when that place is transnational, rather than 
contained within state frameworks of law? These questions cannot be 
answered on an intellectual scaffolding that has already determined who gets 
to count as a collective person up front, nor one that limits discussions of the 
human to biological registers or to teleological, universalist humanism.18
In these examples, the question starts to shift from the ways that forms of life 
interact with one another against an abiotic backdrop on which varieties of 
cultural meanings are projected, to one where ‘the living’ is not yet settled. In 
this context, we might wish to work through the problems of understanding 
these other formulations of the living, and at times, we may need to 
understand that these worldviews are not commensurable with one another – 
that is, they cannot be fully reduced to one particular framework or fully 
translated, on any side. At the same time, neither should we assume full 
incommensurability of worlds, as the very process of interpretation, nor that 
politics involve forms of learning, understanding, and translation. The 
question of what is and is not commensurable, and how they are made so, is 
ultimately a contextual one – it is something that we can ask about in global 
politics, rather than stipulate up front.
Questions around the interactions, sortings, and practices of living beings to 
produce international outcomes; questions of who is a person and who is a 
collective person, and why; and questions about how multiple humanisms 
work in practice, are key avenues of inquiry that open up in IR around the 
politics of life after anthropocentrism.
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Performing the Posthuman: An 
Essay in Three Acts
STEFANIE FISHEL
Setting the Scene
The posthuman is defined by its conceptual complexity. It is not quite a 
temporal creation of what will come after the human, but is often thought of in 
the future tense. What will homo sapiens become next? Alternatively, the 
posthuman, like postmodernity, often overlaps with the modern and the pre-
modern. The posthuman can be located in the ethical writings of Spinoza 
(Braidotti 2013), Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (Shapin and Schaffer 1985), and 
Mary Shelley’s Creature (Carretero-Gonzalez 2016). The posthuman can be 
the ‘more-than-human’ (Massumi 2014) or an ethical understanding of a 
subject that can traverse worlds, both human and nonhuman (Braidotti 2013; 
Mitchell 2014).
In theorising the posthuman, we return to the world of the nonhuman animal 
or rethink biopolitics writ large as a ‘displacement of the subject’ (Parikka 
2015). Thinking the posthuman is part of a tradition that knows that any 
theories of subjectivity must include the embodied nature of what we then 
name ‘subjects’ (Braidotti 2006). It questions the divisions we have created 
between these subjects and objects, the human and animal. While it is not 
always a biological entity or an evolution of the human animal, it is entangled 
with both natural and technological systems. As a cyborg, the posthuman can 
redefine our relationship to nature (Haraway 1991) or be the sum of human 
fears that our technology will overcome and control us.19 The Terminator is at 
19  I leave aside transhumanism in this chapter as it takes a fundamentally different 
approach to technology and the human body. See Hayles (1999) for a history of 
cybernetics and bodies and Kurzweil (2005) for an application on transhuman values to 
human bodies.
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the top of the list for favourite movie hero and villain simultaneously (Singer 
2008).
Like Lyotard’s (1984, xxiv) definition of the postmodern, posthumanism is 
inclined toward incredulity when it crosses metanarratives. Therefore, the 
posthuman can be aligned with other approaches and techniques that 
question universality, rationality, and scientific objectivity. As its very name 
implicates the posthuman in humanist traditions, using language—as spoken 
and written language is seen as what makes humans exceptional in the great 
chain of being—often obfuscates other understandings of the world through 
affect, art, and desire. Those imagining the posthuman would have to ask if 
the master’s tools could dismantle the master’s house (Lorde 2007, 110-114)? 
This includes discourse, history, science, and technology—at least those 
birthed from Western civilization are deeply implicated in what the posthuman 
may desire to leave behind. ‘So what of the humanities,’ Colebrook (2014, 
169-70) queries, ‘if anything at all, might we say is worth saving?’ Humanism 
is actually quite inhuman, she answers, but what can posthumanism offer? 
Perhaps it is contaminated and possessed by the repressed, by all that 
colonialisms and capitalisms have buried and tried to hide, murder, and 
torture. The posthuman knows that the subject, as we have created it, has a 
special relationship to the degradation and dismissal of objects and the 
objectification of subjects. These distinctions between the two are a story 
about our modern world-making and this tale of intertwining needs to be 
retold to create more just and peaceful relationships.
As scholars, we often speak of the posthuman as a noun. Our debates 
revolve around whether the concept can be housed in some kind of bounded 
subjectivity that we can define and attach to particular bodies. Can we know 
it, secure it, nurture it, theorise it, dismiss it, ignore it? Is it cyborg (Haraway 
1991, 191)? Zombie (Lauro and Embry 2008)? Fossil (Yusoff 2013)? Android 
(Dick 1996)? Hybrid (MacCormack 2016; Chen 2012; Lowenhaupt Tsing 
2015)? Digital (Adams and Thompson 2016; Gibson 1984)?
Cary Wolfe asked, ‘What is posthumanism?’ (2010), but for this essay the 
question becomes: ‘What is posthumanising?’ 
Learning and being open to how to cultivate the conditions to become 
otherwise: this is posthumanising. We must build the conditions that make the 
human obsolete; to follow Buckminster Fuller (1970) in I Seem to Be a Verb, 
we can’t fight existing reality. We need to create models that make the old 
ones obsolete. This is systems biology and quantum physics, monism not 
Cartesian dualism. Most importantly it is interrogating the violence of the 
nature/culture dichotomy (Morton 2010) and that the distinction between 
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object and subject are not what we thought they were (Gane 2006) or that 
they were never there (Latour 1993). Following Haraway and Latour, if we 
have never been human or modern what does it mean to be posthuman?
To answer this, I want to focus on this desire to be something different. Not as 
teleology, but rather what the process of evolving, either biologically, 
intellectually, or culturally may mean for our quotidian lives. 
To further the feeling of action, the remaining will continue in classic three-act 
structure. This essay is equal parts tragedy and comedy, as catharsis must 
come from both grief, for the terrible changes wrought by a fossil fuel 
economy, and hope that this test will leave us will new skills. This catharsis 
will give us a sense of who the human might become to better live within our 
planetary limits: to find ‘wild laughter in the throat of death’ and use mirth to 
move our souls to action (Shakespeare 1598).
This figure of the posthuman will disperse into becoming not being, process 
not product, desire not completion. If not a subject coming into itself, then is it 
a plea? A plea to a future to hear, to witness that we crave to become 
transformed. 
The posthuman is an acknowledgement of the despair and exhaustion 
wrapped up in what it must mean to be modern, to be human. We are so tired 
of being what we are now: murderous, hateful, warlike, wasteful, narcissistic, 
violent, careless, vicious, cruel, and belligerent. Through this shell of the 
human it becomes hard to move toward the antonymic of that which we are 
tired of being and enacting. 
Posthumanising is not a plea, but a roar to a world that has silenced so many 
for so long. ‘My barbaric yawp,’ crowed Walt Whitman (1949, 1088) in ‘Song 
of Myself’: ‘I too am not a bit tamed—I too am untranslatable; I sound my 
barbaric yawp over the roof of the world.’ Dr. Suess’s Horton (1954) the 
Elephant heard it, too. His ear heard a Yopp! from the Whos as he listened to 
the clover held in his trunk.  That speck of dust on a clover that made noises 
in greater amounts: ‘We are here. We are here. WE ARE HERE…And that 
Yopp, that one small extra Yopp, put it over, finally at last from that speck on 
that clover.’
What if this shout and this demand to be heard cannot be a something at all? 
Even more precisely, what if housing this desire, this striving, this yawp in a 
body has taken us down the wrong path? Put differently, what if the focus is 
shifted from what the posthuman is to what the posthuman can do? The 
posthuman is an action word, not a person, place, or thing. Posthumanising is 
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a performance of our desire to change ourselves.
Performing the Posthuman: An Apocapolitical Tragicomedy in Three 
Acts
Act I: The exposition, or posthumanising ethics
The fundamental ethical question surrounding the posthuman, or how ethics 
could be posthumanised, is to acknowledge that humans have speciously 
separated themselves from other living things and processes on the planet 
and called it nature. We then, through religion and dominion, humanism and 
natural law, turned the earth and its many other beings into resources to be 
used with no moral, intrinsic worth except that which humans could take and 
use for their own ends. Other world-views that were counter to this were 
colonised and even eradicated, leaving this dichotomy with little to stand 
against it. With this backdrop, the ethical issue most at stake is how we treat 
other living beings (Waldau 2007).
One of the most serious elisions in much of the posthuman literature is not 
acknowledging that many humans have been treated as things, objects, and 
likened to the nonhuman animals we use and abuse. This is unacceptable for 
both.  For those who have not been considered fully human, the posthuman is 
an intolerable erasing of suffering and violence added to a toxic 
misunderstanding of world history and the complex relations of power that 
exist globally from North to South, East to West, black to white, female to 
male, rich to poor, human to nonhuman animal. These past and present 
hierarchies will reproduce the same power structures if we are not vigilant.
The posthuman can be recognised as an always already racialised and 
gendered body born from the flesh of the slave, the incarcerated, the 
oppressed (Weheliye 2014). It stands opposed the Enlightenment Man and its 
monopoly on subjectivity based on white, male European bodies (Hayles 
1999). The posthuman can shed ‘Man’s’ allegedly neutral and apolitical skin 
for a rainbow cloak of plurality and multiplicity. 
Posthumanising recognises this and moves to create radical solidarity along 
all lines of difference (Morton 2017). This includes overcoming the human/
nonhuman distinction and nurturing an ethics of entanglement in multispecies 
communities and co-evolved nonhuman animal companions (Haraway 2003; 
2007). Disconnecting ourselves from nature has led toward violence to 
nonhuman others and legitimates that violence and suffering (Wright 2014). 
Extending care to nonhumans and thinking across species lines will increase 
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our ability to create deeper cultural and social connections among humans, 
too (Waldau 2007). Posthumanising will recognise that fighting for the dignity 
of human and nonhuman animal life will improve the lives of all. Our fates are 
inextricably linked and all must be protected, honoured, and liberated 
together. Even if posthumans will think in verbs, we cannot denigrate the 
noun and we must recognise and celebrate life and things (Bennett 2010).
Posthumanising will be hard work that builds a planetary geontological 
(Povinelli 2016) politics that does not rest on hidden exclusions and violence. 
Posthumanising will create healthy diverse communities - human and 
nonhuman - rather than maximising profit and personal wealth. It becomes 
paramount to recreate ourselves around a new materialism that values the 
earth for more than what we can consume from it.
Act II: The conflict, or a compromised biome and ecosystems facing collapse
There is urgency involved in rethinking ourselves: this is not just an exercise 
in high theory or pedagogy for the classroom. The human and its position on 
Earth is a topic of much concern in global neoliberal capitalism and those 
arrayed against its rapacious and utilitarian use of fossil fuels and human 
capital. It is vitally important that we change who we are. As subjects created 
for consumption, Earth and its inhabitants are facing an unprecedented crisis. 
Due to the actions of human beings, the earth has entered a geologic epoch 
named the Anthropocene. The term was coined by Paul Crutzen in 2002 and 
has now been recommended for adoption after a prolonged study of human 
activity on our planetary systems. In September 2016, the International 
Geological Congress reported that, indeed, due to radioactive materials left 
by nuclear testing, plastic and power plant pollution, to name but a few, the 
Anthropocene can now be recognised as a reality. The end of the Holocene—
the previous era—is marked by sea level rise, increased carbon dioxide 
emissions, deforestation, development, and global mass extinction of 
nonhuman species. The naming of this new era after anthropos can be taken 
as evidence toward our entangled relationship with the planet that provides 
the conditions for life. It is a view that reminds us of our bodies and 
connections, rather than the ultimate homage to our self-absorption. As 
Wright (2014 online) stresses, ‘looking at the world from the perspective of 
the Anthropocene reveals patterns of connection that bind flesh to earth, sea 
and sky on a multispecies planet.’ 
Unfortunately, near universal scientific acceptance of this epoch has not been 
matched politically. The Paris Convention (COP21) agreement in 2015 
represents a major international decision on climate change action, but the 
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nature of international treaties leaves it open to failure at the state level: 
ratification of the treaty must happen in each state and then laws and policies 
must change to reflect the international commitment. Previously, I, and my co-
authors (Burke et al. 2016, 500), have argued that we need a politics to 
match our planet:
Global ecological collapse brings new urgency to the claim 
that ‘we are all in this together’ – humans, animals, ecologies, 
biosphere. To survive, we must ask questions that are 
intimately connected to capitalism, modernity, and oppression. 
We must ensure that our diplomacy, our politics, and our 
institutions are open to those who will bear the brunt of 
ecological change.
Most importantly, this change from noun to verb aids in seeing ourselves as 
not individuals in the humanist, liberal tradition, but as an active part of an 
entangled and complex web—or nested sets of permeable vessels—of both 
human and nonhuman life on a shared planet (Fishel 2017).
Posthumanising will include acknowledging the planetary real and recreating 
systemic human agency that recognises earth systems and their boundaries. 
The Anthropocene should be presented as an era that reminds us that we are 
in it together and not another retelling of the story of dominion over a natural 
place external to the world of the human. 
Act III: The resolution, or posthumanising activism
This focus on posthumanising will emphasise two broad areas as possible 
avenues for action: the ethical, and the political/disciplinary, through activism. 
Active posthumanising will mean engaged and direct action in multiple 
contexts and across multiple registers. Politically, how might posthumanising 
be deployed into concerns that also support those from ecological, feminist, 
queer, postcolonialist, and anticapitalist standpoint (Behar 2016)?
Posthumanising academic disciplines remains a challenge. Our very ways of 
thinking are firmly rooted in humanism and siloed into different disciplines in 
the modern neoliberal university. This hierarchical and isolated institutional 
matrix for intellectual work makes asking complex questions across 
disciplines difficult. There is a clear disciplinary division of labour between the 
social sciences and the natural sciences. For Andrew Pickering (2005), they 
carve up the world in systematic ways: the natural sciences study the world of 
things where people are absent and there is a clear idea of objectivity and a 
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need to understand the systems themselves divorced from the researcher’s 
place in the systems. In the social sciences and humanities, researchers talk 
about people and not about things with an idea that the social is separate 
reality from the world of things that natural scientists study. As discussed 
above, this is a beautiful dualism: world of things and world of people. The 
posthuman view, according to Pickering (2005), is that which allows us to ‘see 
double’, to overlap people and things in our research programs, matters of 
concern, and telling of events. Posthumanising the disciplines will have us 
reject these units of analysis because the world does not impose that division 
of people and things on us. We make the world and impose legibility upon it. 
The units of analysis can be shifted, the posthuman can see double 
(Pickering 2005).
The tragedy and scale of destruction brought on by climate change 
challenges all of our political systems and institutions. Do we need to learn 
how to die as a species, as Roy Scranton (2015) declares? Or, as Naomi 
Klein (2014) argues, do we need to take up the challenge of the climate crisis 
as our best chance at creating a new world, and see that crisis as causing a 
fracture in our collective subjectivity that will allow us to tear through to new 
relations and practices? The nation-state will continue to decline under 
ecological crisis and cannot offer solutions that it had claimed to in the last 
century.  In this assertion, Klein (2014) echoes Guattari’s writing on the 
ecological crisis. He wrote: ‘Instead of clinging to general recommendations 
we would be implementing effective practices of experimentation, as much on 
a microsocial level as on a larger institutional scale’ (Guattari 2008, 24). 
Change will happen from the grassroots level. While global level change is 
necessary, it must be fought and redefined at the level of specific practices 
and sites, like Standing Rock. In other words, planetary change could lead to 
the discovering of the creative potential of people – in all parts of the world 
and from all social positions – to reshape the priorities of regions, states, and 
economies (Connolly 2017).
We can think of Fuller’s (1970, 1) famous quote: ‘I live on Earth at present, 
and I don’t know what I am. I know that I am not a category. I am not a thing 
— a noun. I seem to be a verb, an evolutionary process — an integral 
function of the universe.’
If used as a starting point, the posthuman could see this rephrased for the 
Anthropocene: ‘I live in love with the Earth and its beings, and I am always 
becoming what I am. I know that I am a category. I am enmeshed—a thing 
living entwined with other things. I seem to be a verb, an ever changing 
process—a cosmic roll of the universal dice.’
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This crisis could be the beginning.  It is our last, and best chance, to make 
another world rather than just mutely witness the end of our fossil-fuelled 
civilization.  If last century was more about freeing the carbon than it was 
about freeing humanity from its chains (Wark 2015), this century could be 
able to understand our posthuman condition, and build new kin groups 
(Haraway 2016) in such a way that a world could emerge that is more 
equitable, loving, and just than the last.
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Ecological Security
MATT MCDONALD
In recent years, the idea that issues such as climate change might pose a 
threat to security has become prominent, and environmental issues more 
broadly have featured significantly in debates about redefining security since 
the 1980s (Mathews 1989; Myers 1989). 
Traditionally, approaches to the relationship between security and 
environmental change have asked whether and how environmental issues 
constitute a security threat. This is a bad place to start, for two reasons. First, 
it suggests that we as analysts can establish criteria for defining security at an 
abstract level, and measure issues (whether climate change, population 
displacement or terrorism) against that criteria. Such an approach is 
problematic. It ignores the social construction of security: the fact that 
different political communities understand security in different ways, and the 
same political communities change the way they understand security over 
time. A fixed and abstract definition of security is ultimately inconsistent with 
the need to come to terms with the meaning given to security in practice (see 
McDonald 2012). This is important because of the politics of security: the 
ways in which different depictions of security and threat serve to encourage 
particular sets of responses to those issues in practice.
Second, and of particular relevance for those interested in the politics of 
linking environmental issues with security, the effects of this linkage are not 
simply about whether environmental issues are defined as a security threat: 
whether they are ‘securitised’. Paradoxically, the view that the designation of 
threat defines the politics of a response to it is evident among both advocates 
and sceptics of an environment-security relationship. For advocates, defining 
environmental issues as security threats means approaching these issues as 
‘high politics’, ensuring political urgency, prioritization and funding usually 
associated with traditional security threats (see Hartmann 2008). 
Securitization, in this view, is ultimately a good thing. For sceptics, 
63 Reflections on the Posthuman in International Relations
securitization is problematic because security has a powerful and sedimented 
association with defence and the state (eg Deudney 1990), and/or potentially 
enables the suspension of ‘normal politics’ and the pursuit of frequently 
illiberal emergency measures. The latter is, of course, a key concern of so-
called Copenhagen School theorists of securitization (eg Buzan et al 1998; 
Wæver 1995).
Yet ultimately, the political implications of linking environmental issues like 
climate change with security are determined not by the simple act of making 
this link- of securitising. Rather, what matters in political and normative terms 
is the way security itself is understood. Specifically, different discourses of 
security- conceptions of whose security matters, from what threats, which 
agents are responsible for providing it and through what means- have 
radically different implications in terms of the practices they encourage. While 
a discourse orienting towards national security might encourage adaptation 
and even military preparedness for potential conflict associated with the 
effects of environmental change, a discourse orienting towards human 
security would encourage mitigation strategies and a focus on the threats 
facing vulnerable human populations (see McDonald 2012; 2013). In these 
senses, linking climate change and security can have radically different 
effects depending on the way in which security is understood, and especially 
different answers to the question of whose security matters. 
Using the example of climate change, this paper is divided into two sections. 
In the first I outline the contours of different discourses of security as applied 
to climate change, illustrating the ethical choices upon which these 
discourses are based and pointing to the practices they encourage. In the 
second I make a case for an ecological security discourse. Simply, if a linkage 
between an issue like climate change and security is to be made, some 
discourses are better than others in terms of the defensibility of the principles 
they are informed by and the responses they suggest. Here I suggest that the 
most defensible ethical foundation for this linkage is one that focuses on 
ecosystem resilience and the rights and needs of vulnerable contemporary 
populations, future generations and other living beings. While such a 
discourse confronts important dilemmas and powerful political impediments, it 
is one that rests on a stronger moral and philosophical foundation. And 
perhaps more importantly, it is a discourse arguably necessitated by the scale 
of the threat posed by climate change and the changing nature of our 
relationship to the environment in the context of the Anthropocene: the 
contemporary geological era in which humans have altered the earth system 
upon which humans themselves depend (see Steffan et al 2007, as well as 
Corry, Harrington and Rothe in this volume).
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Discourses of Climate Security
There is a range of different ways in which environmental change generally, 
and climate change specifically, could be and have been linked to security. 
The most powerful and prominent of these discourses is that of ‘national 
security’, with the focus here on the possibility that climate change might 
undermine the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the nation-state. Such a 
vision has found its way into national security strategies throughout the world, 
has been advanced by public-policy oriented think tanks (especially in the 
USA), and has achieved a prominent place in academic debates (see 
Brzoska 2008; Busby 2008; CNA 2007).
In such a vision of security, the state retains its central role as the referent 
object (the ‘whom’ in ‘security for whom’); the state and potentially its military 
are key agents of security; threats are associated largely with conflict or 
border integrity arising from climate change; and means of providing security 
focus on adaptation to manifestations of threat (Busby 2008). Perhaps the 
starkest example of this discourse, and its limitations, was a 2003 Pentagon 
Report prepared by Schwartz and Randall (2003) examining the potential 
national security implications of an abrupt climate change scenario for the 
United States. In the report, the authors made the claim that some relatively 
self-sufficient states like the US might seek to build more effective boundaries 
around the state to prevent those displaced by climate change – 
environmental refugees – from entering. 
This example clearly constitutes a perverse response to climate change. 
Victims of climate change are presented as potential threats; the focus is 
exclusively on adaptation, not mitigation; there is no focus on the rights of 
vulnerable populations; and no genuine possibility – consistent with the 
Realist tradition in which this discourse is located – for international 
cooperation to address this global problem (see Dalby 2009). Certainly, this 
approach would endorse the concerns of those sceptics opposed to the 
securitization of climate change. 
More recently, a range of efforts have been made to link climate change to 
international security. Here, the emphasis is on the possibility that climate 
change might undermine international stability or challenge the normative 
basis of an international society. The nature of the climate threat is its 
possible contribution to large-scale humanitarian crises, population 
displacement and even international conflict. This was the subject of debates 
in the UN Security Council in 2007 and 2011, and this discourse has also 
been taken up by think tanks and NGOs (see Smith and Vivekananda 2007). 
Most recently it has been prominent in linkages made between climate 
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change and conflict in Syria and even the emergence of Daesh (see Baker 
2015; Strozier and Berkell 2015), building on earlier linkages between climate 
change and conflict in Darfur (see UNEP 2007; Ki Moon 2007). The referent 
object of security is international society; threats are threats to international 
order and stability associated with climate change; agents are largely defined 
in terms of key international institutions; and means of security are ultimately 
cooperative international efforts focused on a combination of mitigation and 
adaptation (see Purvis and Busby 2004). 
The emphasis here on the possibility of international cooperation, the 
suggestion of some role for prevention (i.e. mitigation) and the general sense 
that a moral universe extends beyond the nation-state suggests progress 
from a national security discourse. Yet this discourse remains closely linked to 
the preservation of the state system, a position with potentially problematic 
ethical foundations and implications. Of course at a practical level, an 
international state system has - at best - responded inadequately to the 
problem of climate change to date, with current mitigation commitments 
inadequate for preventing dangerous climate change and global climate 
cooperation erring consistently towards the lowest common denominator in 
international negotiations (see Stevenson and Dryzek 2014; Eckersley 2017). 
At worst, the international system has helped drive processes of global 
climate change through endorsing and enabling the neoliberal economic 
order, which has driven rapid industrialization and over-consumption. While a 
step forward in linking climate change and security, then, we might ask 
whether the international system is fit for purpose in addressing climate 
change, and whether the vision of international society in this international 
security discourse is ultimately one worth preserving (see McDonald 2013).
A more radical climate security discourse focuses on climate change as a 
threat to human security. For advocates of this discourse, climate change 
already poses a threat to human security, defined in terms of peoples’ survival 
and their capacity to pursue meaningful, sustainable lives in the face of 
climate change (see Barnett et al 2010). This approach has been more 
marginal to international practice than the above discourses, but has been 
advanced by NGO groups, was explicitly endorsed by the UNDP (2007) and 
in a 2009 UN General Assembly discussion of the climate change-security 
relationship, and was the subject of a chapter in the most recent IPCC report 
on the impacts of climate change (IPCC 2014). The referent object in this 
discourse is people; threats are those that challenge the lives, livelihoods and 
choices of people; means of security focus on mitigation but with some place 
for adaptation; and a wide variety of actors – from states to international 
institutions to civil society groups – are seen as potential security agents (see 
O’Brien 2006).
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In orienting towards the direct and immediate effects of climate change for 
people, and focusing our attention on vulnerable human populations, the 
human security discourse advances a more ethically defensible position in the 
context of climate change. The practices it encourages are also focused on 
preventing the worst manifestations of climate change through urgent 
mitigation action, and reducing the threat for those most vulnerable. Yet there 
are clear dilemmas or challenges here. First, it is difficult to assess and 
redress sources of human insecurity in the context of climate change given 
both varied populations with possibly competing interests, and acute 
uncertainty and complexity with regard to climate change and its effects. 
Second, and in the context of agency, a focus on vulnerable human 
populations requires international institutions and the most powerful states to 
act as agents for others and beyond their own immediate self-interest. Both of 
these challenges apply to the ecological security discourse, to be discussed. 
Clearly, this discourse constitutes a progressive approach to the climate-
security relationship, one whose orientation towards vulnerable people is far 
more defensible than approaches that value the defence of institutions or 
already privileged populations, and whose practices orient primarily towards 
mitigation rather than adaptation alone. Yet it still draws the line at 
contemporary human populations, in this context failing to recognise 
obligations to future generations or other living beings. And in endorsing a 
humanist approach, arguably this discourse fails to recognise and respond to 
the changing nature of our relationship to the environment in the context of 
the Anthropocene (Grove 2014). A case can therefore be made for a more 
radical climate security discourse still - one oriented towards ecological 
security.
Towards Ecological Security
Ultimately, existing discourses of ‘climate security’ orient towards the 
preservation of contemporary forms of human communities, whether defined 
in national, international or genuinely human terms. Some of these discourses 
are clearly more progressive than others in encouraging action oriented 
towards genuinely addressing the problem itself; recognising obligations to 
vulnerable communities; and even suggesting the need for urgent and rapid 
change to redress the challenges posed by climate change. Yet the climate 
crisis arguably suggests the need for yet more radical reorientation of ethical 
principles and urgent sets of practices than that articulated in the above 
discourses. And the narrative of the Anthropocene serves too to point to the 
need to fundamentally re-examine the distinctions between humanity and 
nature that arguably underpin all the discourses of security noted above. But 
if a shift towards a genuinely ecological security discourse appears needed, 
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what are the key contours of this approach to climate security? 
An ecological security discourse is one that orients towards the resilience of 
ecosystems themselves, in turn enabling the protection of the most vulnerable 
across time, space and species. Resilience is defined in terms of the capacity 
of ecosystems to sustain life, and retain their organizational structure and 
function in the face of perturbation and change (see Barnett 2001; Adger et al 
2011). Urgent mitigation action is prioritised in this discourse but with some 
space for adaptation to help preserve the functionality of ecosystems. All 
actors with the capacity to generate avoidable harm have responsibility in 
terms of agency, depending on their capacity and contribution to the problem. 
And while endorsing broad principles, such a discourse must be defined in 
terms of a commitment to dialogue, reflexivity and humility: ecosystem 
functionality is too complex for highly prescriptive accounts; universal 
principles must be reconciled with local knowledge, understanding and 
values; and reflexivity is clearly necessary to prevent this discourse from 
becoming a repressive or misanthropic orthodoxy. What we are talking about 
here, ultimately, is a set of principles that might be defended as an 
appropriate basis for actors to view and approach the climate change-security 
relationship, with the actions this encourages necessarily context-specific. 
Such a discourse has not been prominent in either academic debate or 
political interventions linking climate change and security. Of course, this may 
reflect the fact that it has a limited constituency among those with power (see 
Barnett 2001:121), and that we can clearly advocate progressive approaches 
to climate change without recourse to the language of security. Yet as the 
climate security link is increasingly made in academic and policy circles, with 
climate change featuring in UNSC debates and in national security strategies 
of states throughout the world (Scott 2015), it is important to examine the 
form and likely implications of this linkage. In this context, we need to 
consider the contours of a more progressive approach in terms of both the 
principles upon which it is based and the practices it encourages. Simply, if 
the ‘securitization’ of climate change is becoming more common, we cannot 
ignore the climate-security relationship. Instead, and reflecting the political 
significance of security (see Browning and McDonald 2013; Wæver 1995), we 
need to ask how these linkages are made, whose security is considered 
important, what a progressive linkage (with defensible principles and 
progressive implications in practice) might look like and what prospects exist 
for such a discourse to be articulated, embraced and even institutionalised.    
A shift towards the embrace of an ecological security discourse in the context 
of climate change might be difficult to imagine, but it might be one 
necessitated by a number of factors. First, it is difficult to justify an exclusive 
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ethical focus on contemporary human populations, especially those limited to 
particular spatial areas. Drawing on holistic ethics and some insights of 
ecological perspectives (eg Naess 1989) and critical political ecology (see 
Eckersley 2005), an ecological security discourse challenges the idea of 
limiting our ethical boundaries to currently living human populations and 
encourages us to consider the rights and needs of others – now and into the 
future – who rely on the continued function of those ecosystems. Second, and 
related to this, the new reality of the Anthropocene encourages us to revisit 
the relationship between humanity and the conditions of our own survival. The 
Anthropocene arguably requires us to revisit the separation between humans 
and nature central to contemporary political thought and action, and 
recognise that we can no longer orient our security towards the conservation 
of the status quo (see also Mitchell 2014; Grove 2014).
There are, of course, profound challenges and dilemmas associated with this 
discourse. If our focus is ecosystem resilience in the face of change, means 
of security would emphasise mitigation but potentially extend to controversial 
practices focused on adaptation and stop-gap measures, including 
geoengineering. Dilemmas here are immediately apparent. First, such 
projects are frequently advocated by those who want to support a continued 
role for fossil fuels. Second, pursuing geoengineering strategies can involve 
the search for a climate change ‘silver bullet’, rather than profound changes 
necessary in the way we live (see Dalby 2015). And third, the scale of 
complexity and uncertainty that is a defining feature of ecosystem 
functionality makes it exceedingly difficult to be certain about what the 
implications of our interventions will be and therefore what practices we 
should pursue (see Cudworth and Hobden 2013). This becomes even more 
complicated when trying to weigh potentially competing interests across 
populations, species and over time. 
Even if we are confident about what sets of practices an ecological security 
discourse would encourage, it clearly has a limited political constituency and 
limited political traction. If it is difficult enough to get states to cooperate with 
other states to solve a problem that affects them, some might suggest it is 
impossible to imagine how an approach oriented towards other living beings 
or future generations will find its way into meaningful public debate (Barnett 
2001). And finally, the tendency to articulate universal principles must 
confront the challenges of negotiating with local practices and localised 
understandings of ecosystems themselves. 
All of the above do represent profound challenges in making sense of what an 
ecological security discourse might look like and even whether it is 
defensible. But the extent to which these dilemmas are particular to this 
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discourse should not be overstated. Even national security discourses have 
to come to terms with uncertainty and complexity in terms of assessing where 
future strategic threats might come from and how state resources should be 
used to prepare for these, for example. The dangers of reconciling universal 
principles with local contexts are all too familiar to advocates of international 
security, whose attempts to manage peace operations must always negotiate 
this divide (Paris and Sisk eds. 2009). And in trying to combine a case for 
change with the need to enlist powerful actors to be agents of that change, 
human security discourses always risk being coopted by those institutions 
without fundamentally reorienting their practices or the basis upon which they 
make decisions (see Christie 2010). And perhaps obviously, political limits to 
change confront all those advocating change, almost all the time. 
Yet we have clearly seen major changes in dominant understandings and 
practices of security over time, from the redefinition of sovereignty as the 
responsibility to protect to the endorsement of nuclear disarmament. These 
should serve as reminders that change can and does happen, and advocates 
of ecological security might find bases for hope in the embrace of principles 
like precaution, common but differentiated responsibility, debates arising 
around the Anthropocene and the global, long-term and ecological orientation 
of much of global civil society mobilization. And by linking climate change and 
security, the profound nature of the challenge posed by climate change 
arguably compels us to think in new ways about what security means and 
how it might be realised.  
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7
Posthuman Security and Care in 
the Anthropocene
CAMERON HARRINGTON
As many of the authors in this collection make clear, traditional and critical 
ideas about security have been largely anthropocentric. Whether the focus 
has been on the strategic manoeuvrings of states acting in relation to 
balances of power, or on the performative effects of security discourses, all 
security has been human security. To speak of security absent the human 
subject has been considered irrational or worse, uninteresting. 
Recently though, this perspective has been shifting, thanks in large part to a 
growing alertness to the diverse forms of life that produce and are affected by 
conditions of (in)security. In an ironic twist, this nascent posthuman sensibility 
is deeply connected to the realization that we have entered into a 
monumental period of global environmental change enacted by humans. The 
Anthropocene – the Age of (hu)Man – has garnered enormous amounts of 
attention across the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities. 
Beyond encapsulating the environmental catastrophe that is unfolding before 
us, a central motif of Anthropocene thinking, as it has been translated from 
geological stratigraphy, is the collapse of the divide between the social and 
the natural. As the human population explodes and we settle into a new world 
that may be four degrees warmer by century’s end, we are obliged to accept 
not simply the status of humans as geological agents, but as entangled 
agents. 
This reimagining explodes the western, Cartesian belief in dualism, whereby 
minds and bodies are separated along with the spiritual and the material, 
humans and nature: the inside/outside divides that have been so central to 
security studies (Walker 1993). This dualism is justified principally via a belief 
in radically separated reason, which allows for humans to appear different, 
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outside and above an inferiorised and manipulable nature (Plumwood 2002). 
The effects of this dualism are to present humans as rational, acting, agents 
fulfilling their desires in a passive, intentional, global environment. The 
poverty of these ‘Cartesian coordinates’ has been highlighted for decades in 
security studies. These critiques have been presented primarily in terms of 
the breakdown of the Westphalian system and the exploration of alternative 
political identities beyond the state – such as nations, races, classes, 
movements, religions, cultures, or gender (Walker 1993). The Anthropocene 
further breaks down the divide not simply in terms of political identity but by 
emphasising the ways that non-human species, technologies, and natures 
interact with global security (Harrington 2016). The Human Age compels us to 
question prevailing forms of anthropocentrism and confront the power of 
other-than-human things in the world. 
Readers may wonder what, if anything, can be done? As the recent ‘Planet 
Politics Manifesto’ laments, ‘Trying to write from within IR, we find ourselves 
prisoners in our own vocation. We are speechless, or even worse, cannot find 
words to represent the world and those within it.’ (Burke, Fishel, Mitchell, 
Dalby, and Levine 2016, 502) If everything changes in the Anthropocene - the 
objects of study, the variety of harms, the nature of responsibility – what is 
left? Is security obsolete or powerless in the face of Earth system changes? 
Should we move to something else - perhaps resilience, or quantum politics, 
or some form of risk theory? Can posthuman security perspectives really 
transcend the IR ‘prison’ or will they simply replicate its Holocene-bred, 
anthropocentric logics within an expanded circle of concern? This article 
argues against either the abandonment of security or its reduction to its solely 
negative or positive forms. Instead, it prompts us to cultivate new (and 
activate very old) forms of care-based security. The new world of the 
Anthropocene and the posthuman sensibilities that arise from it offer us 
simultaneous and conflicting impulses. Given the reality that the Earth at once 
offers a safe haven for existence and poses formidable challenges for life and 
the capacities for collective human action, security politics might return to the 
ultimate horizon – the impulse to care.20 
Security and Care
The Anthropocene is indeed a crisis, both in material terms and, far less 
importantly, for the study of security. Grasping the idea of the Earth as both a 
unified system and as something with multiple states of being with 
imperceptible, shifting, and seeping thresholds is a terrifyingly difficult process 
(Clark 2016, 139). It offers us little hope that life within it will be any better for 
20  To whom or what we extend care is open-ended and might include life, non-life, and 
technology. 
75 Reflections on the Posthuman in International Relations
most humans and our non-human kin. Yet, to reduce the future to apocalyptic 
visions of flooded cities, charred farmlands and waves of migrants battling for 
access to ever-dwindling resources in the developed world is a mythical 
replay of Hobbesian-inspired security forms that should have long ago been 
abandoned. The Anthropocene should likewise not be reduced to some 
innate benevolence of a whole system that is designed either by chance or 
design to protect humans. Given the violent and dynamic tendencies of the 
planet, there is a need to challenge the feminised image of Gaia, so prevalent 
in Anthropocene discourse, which portrays the Earth system as a bountiful 
goddess or a nurturing mother, able to provide for all life, including humans, 
so long as we protect and sustain her natural state. As Latour reminds us, the 
Earth system (Gaia) is both nurturing and destructive. She is not indifferent 
because she is so clearly affected by human behaviour. But She has aims 
that directly produce human insecurity and civilizational collapse. She is 
simultaneously ‘…too fragile to play the calming role of old nature, too 
unconcerned by our destiny to be a Mother, too unable to be propitiated by 
deals and sacrifices to be a Goddess.’ (Latour 2011) 
If we are to focus on cultivating a different form of security, one that is post-
human, post-natural, and that does not rely upon Holocene-bred logics, 
where might we turn? Can we end up avoiding all that and still call it security? 
While I am aware of the difficulty of answering that question here, I argue that 
security will likely remain a necessary component of adjusting to the 
Anthropocene. Despite this, we are forced to reconsider the traditional 
obsession with tragedy (which is everywhere in Anthropocene discourse) and 
instead focus on care. The notion of care attunes us to the shifting contours 
of life and death in the Anthropocene. A security that is caring and careful 
preserves the concept’s historical coherence. It also emphasises the 
relational practices that underpin the survival and flourishing of life in addition 
to embracing and accepting the finality of earthly existence in the 
Anthropocene. Finally, supporting multi-perspective forms of care action 
helps amend traditional security ethics like autonomy, non-interference and 
reciprocity. 
It may seem counterintuitive, but security has always been concerned with 
the concept of care. Indeed, if we refer back to Heidegger, it is care that 
motivates human being-in-the-world (what he refers to as Dasein) in the first 
place. It is care that makes existence visible (Heidegger 1978). Likewise, the 
concept of security is at a fundamental level about the human relationship to 
care. John T. Hamilton expertly explains in his book Security: Politics, 
Humanity and the Philology of Care that our concern for security is ultimately 
a concern to be without concern (2013, 10). We have struggled to reconcile 
this from the earliest beginning of the security concept, which was formed via 
Roman fables of the character Cura, the personification of care and concern. 
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From Cura comes the etymological root of security, securitas, which 
translates into modern English as the state of being removed from care; the 
state of being care-free. Hamilton explains, 
The word is transparent enough, featuring three distinct 
components: the prefix sē- (apart, aside, away from); the noun 
cura (care, concern, attention, worry); and the suffix-tas 
(denoting a condition or state of being). Securitas, therefore, 
denotes a condition of being separated from care, a state 
wherein concerns and worries have been put off to the side. 
Man will be literally secure when he is removed from Cura’s 
governance, when his unified being is split apart, back into its 
discrete elements (2013, 5).
This reading tells us that the desire for security – understood as certitude and 
trust – is seemingly universal and timeless. We all seek to reduce uncertainty 
and the risk of personal harm it brings. Securitas is an ideal state where there 
is no risk and care is no longer needed; where we can exist in serene 
tranquility, without worry and with the knowledge that no harm is coming. Yet, 
the flip side of the security-care relationship points to an inherent 
contradiction.
…Securitas can just as well refer to ‘indifference’ (the lack of 
interest) or ‘negligence’ (the lack of concern for a person or 
object). By removing cura as commitment or concentrated 
effort, by ignoring the loved one or neglecting one’s work, the 
elimination of care denotes ‘heedlessness,’ implying that one 
is no longer driven by the concerns that are believed to define 
and guide human existence, moral behavior, or practical 
action. Free from these kinds of concern, we are secure in the 
sense of being inattentive or indifferent, foolhardy or 
delinquent. In this case, the privation of devoted attention 
threatens to leave us deprived (Hamilton 2013, 11).
From its earliest beginnings care has played a central role in security and the 
desire to eradicate care continues to drive our security decisions. Yet 
Hamilton also makes clear that the contours of security have always been 
contested. He weaves in a variety of sources, from ancient Greek poetry to 
Roman stoicism, from Hobbes to Schmitt and Heidegger, to underline the 
‘vast network of mythical, linguistic, and cultural valences and traditions that 
have motivated the term’s usage across histories’ (Hamilton 2013, 276). 
Given the unique ability of the Anthropocene to dissolve the promise of 
security, more care, not less, is needed in the posthuman, postnatural 
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Anthropocene.
The Origins of Care
Part of the modern invocation to care derives from the well-established 
feminist paradigm of care ethics. At its core, care ethics is about concrete, 
particular, relationships. Humans should pursue moral action based upon 
their empathic consideration of the other they exist in relation to. This 
perspective deemphasises the traditional view that ethics should be derived 
from the rational invocation of universal duties, responsibilities, or principles. 
It also rejects attempts to impose Newtonian laws upon social relations. In 
place of this it asks us to consider the unique value of relationships and 
ongoing, shifting patterns of interactions and responses. This means being 
cognizant of the needs, wants, and desires of the ‘world,’ defined as one’s 
self, loved ones, near and distant others, society, and the planet (Engster 
2004, 117). Occupying a moral position requires that we adopt ‘actions and 
attitudes of care, in addition to or even more importantly than those of 
respect, non-interference, and tit-for-tat reciprocity…’ (Collins 2015, 5). Care 
then becomes an approach to life that recognises the needs of others, 
attempts to respond to/provide for those needs, and establishes relationships 
of trust that transcend the boundaries of justice. This centres the social and 
the unequal power relationships that define life in the Anthropocene - moving 
beyond critique to advocate ‘new forms of relationships, institutions, and 
actions that enhance mutuality and well-being’ (Lawson 2007, 9). It also 
recognises how different historical and institutional relationships produce the 
need for care. Such a perspective can be transposed onto human-non-human 
relationships as well. In the context of the Anthropocene this includes how 
human decisions over time have created the conditions for unnatural 
disasters like arctic ice melt, drought, famine, flooding, mass extinction, etc. 
Depending on the particular need, care may also mean retreat from action.  
The ethics of care is perhaps the most significant ethical theory to emerge 
from feminist analyses. How it translates into the world of security – so often 
filled with danger, harm, and violence – is an evolving, still unsettled question. 
Feminist security studies is a diverse and well-institutionalised sub-field, but 
the idea of care remains relatively under-developed as a security concept. 
When it has been examined, most notably over the past two decades by 
scholars like Sara Ruddick (1989), Fiona Robinson (1999, 2011), Virginia 
Held (2006), Kimberly Hutchings (1999; 2000; Hutchings and Frazer 2014) 
and Karin Fierke (2014; 2016) care ethics and security have coalesced 
around the connections between the universal and the particular. They argue 
against security logics that emphasise the ontological primacy of homo 
economicus: the concept of man as an independent, value-maximising and 
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self-reliant subject. Such thinking obscures the particular social reality around 
the world, especially the experiences felt by women, who are more likely to 
‘define themselves in and through their relations with children and other 
family members— including those who are elderly or chronically ill—or with 
friends or members of their communities’ (Robinson 2011, 90). More directly it 
helps maintain a deeply unjust and violent international society that views 
militarism as an inevitable byproduct of human nature rather than a 
masculinised ideology produced through social practice. 
These care authors explore the contours of contemporary security issues like 
the concept of just war, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, and human 
security. Though each offers a unique position, a unifying thread has been a 
fixation on the practices rather than the principles that contribute to violence. 
Most crucially they emphasise the persistence of everyday material 
insecurities (Robinson 2016). Instead of strictly focusing on the spectacular 
moments of conflict and violence that accompany the breakdowns in social 
order, a feminist ethics of security also looks to ‘marginalised sites’ (Stern 
2006, 182-183). Rather than the Schmittian inspired version of securitization 
that is enacted via the transition to a state of exception, care acknowledges 
the relentless insecurities of the unexceptional. The invocation of care also 
provides an alternative to the atomistic theories of ethical virtue that 
emphasise righteous, masculine qualities of honour, courage, intelligence, 
and detachment. 
Toward a Security of Care
Can care, something we are told is ephemeral and localised, be considered 
an adequate response to Anthropocene threats that are planet-wide and 
occur along geological timescales? Can it truthfully be expected to transform 
human actions that are relentlessly critiqued as rapacious and self-
interested? Will it stop the seemingly inevitable ‘climate wars’ (Dyer 2009; 
Parenti 2012)? What if it is used to legitimate neoliberal forms of 
‘humanitarianism’ which are so often accompanied by sovereign and/or 
biopolitical violence on vulnerable populations (Piotukh 2015)? And just what 
can an ethos of care do to subvert or transform the power-laden carbon lock-
ins found in technological, organizational, social and institutional systems 
(Unruh 2002)? 
If held to such standards, the answer is, of course, to concede that care itself 
is inadequate. It will not on its own prevent the earth from warming, hinder the 
damaging powers of market processes, or overcome the deep divisions that 
separate humans from each other and from the wider webs of life in which we 
are all enmeshed. Yet part of the issue with answering the above charges is 
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that the questions themselves are remnants of a past age, whereby security 
is a (human) good to be achieved through action. Care helps repurpose the 
pursuit of security in the Anthropocene – allowing for diverse ethical 
responses fixated on complex human and nonhuman relations - without 
simultaneously offering promise, emancipation, or a fixation on the tragic. Our 
Holocene-bred logics that champion reductive forms of safety and security 
are barriers to Anthropocene-era struggles which require a level of intellectual 
openness that expand and push the boundaries of comfort for most security 
scholars. 
By activating multiple traditions of care, found often in subaltern discourses/
practices, we can recode and reclaim security away from its fatalistic 
determinism that dooms the world to apocalyptic conflicts over dwindling 
resources. Even if such a future comes to pass, the injunction to care is not 
diminished. Care allows us to cross the scalar and temporal zones that are 
impenetrable to conventional security studies, transcend the human-nature 
binaries that restrict who or what is worthy of ethical consideration, and make 
visible the immanent forms of relationality that bind us with our non-human 
companions. Given the character of Earth system changes care is 
appropriate because it demands nothing in return - no search for justice and 
reciprocity in a world that is often indifferent or openly hostile to us. If we are 
to take the Anthropocene seriously we need to grow accustomed to, in fact, 
embrace, loss and failure. It subverts the security problematique – the search 
for stasis, control, and predictability. A caring response obliges us to act in a 
spirit of empathy; to engage in gift-giving, to extend hospitality and kinship to 
human and non-human strangers; and to feel gratitude in the midst of 
ongoing, seemingly perpetual, social and ecological crises. This pushes us 
toward an affirmative sensibility that does not avoid pain, but helps us 
transcend, 
‘The resignation and passivity that ensue from being hurt, lost, 
and dispossessed. One has to become ethical, as opposed to 
applying moral rules and protocols as a form of self-protection. 
An adequate ethical relation is capable of sustaining the 
subject in his or her quest for more inter-relations with others, 
i.e., more ‘Life’, motion, change and transformation.’ (Braidotti 
2011, 289)
The appeal for care is of course open-ended and should not be considered 
definitive, even less a blueprint for action. All of these components depend 
upon the radical rethinking of subjectivity in security – from our ideas about 
the self-contained human as a security actor to the detached versions of 
nature that characterise so much security literature. 
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Care Sensibility in the Anthropocene
This final section will briefly touch on the ways that care can be enacted as a 
security sensibility in the Anthropocene. Principally, it helps us acknowledge 
new forms of risk, uncertainty, and failure. It also allows us to focus on the 
micropolitics of the self and community in relation to a widened circle of 
others without seeking justice or reciprocity.
It is now common to see suggestions that risk has become the dominant logic 
of security (Zedner 2009; O’Malley 2004). Olaf Corry explains that rather than 
defending against and deterring identifiable foes and criminals our security 
practices are designed around prevention, probabilities, possible future 
scenarios and managing diffuse risks (2012, 36).  The new geological interval 
tells us to acknowledge and expect monumental changes, not just in terms of 
a warming climate, but also rising seas, a growing intensity of storm activities, 
increasing periods of extreme drought, and a mass extinction event not seen 
in 56 million years (Kolbert 2014). These changes are too severe and 
unpredictable to properly mitigate risk or assuage fears about the known and 
unknown impacts.  Partially as a result there exists now a new primacy of risk 
as an operating principle as well as a suite of diverse characteristics we might 
call risk practices. Technology is partially responsible but so must we also 
focus on the shifting role of seemingly non-security actors, like the insurance 
industry, who are at the forefront of responding to global environmental 
change. Given the complexity and unpredictability of the Earth system risk 
comprises a key avenue where the Anthropocene and security meet. 
In many ways a security of care allows us to embrace the diverse ways that 
risk and uncertainty intersect in the Anthropocene. To adopt a perspective of 
care would be to accept the fact that what the world will look like in fifty or a 
hundred or a thousand years is largely unknown yet these varying temporal 
scales are worthy of our attention. Though we cannot be certain in specific 
terms, we know that our climatic future will not resemble our past, and thus 
our expectations of security must also change, away from preparing for 
immediate, identifiable, and predicted ‘foes’ and towards a broader security 
ecology that understands that Anthropocene risk is inevitable and inherently 
relational. The speed and scale of global change in the Anthropocene is 
almost imponderable or unimaginable and demands care rather than fear or 
hope.
Extending care and promoting empathic relations in our security practices into 
security requires an awareness of entanglement and relationality. Widening 
the circle of security to encompass not just humans and states, but also the 
generations unborn, non-humans, and ecosystems, is the necessary first step 
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that allows us to advance multi-sited forms of care. I say multi-sited because 
it would be ineffectual and contrary to its spirit to restrict care to state-based 
policies or to advocate for a retreat to inward-focused forms of self-care. Both 
of these have no chance, on their own, to secure the planet. In fact, the 
restriction of viable security actions to a single level would be unaligned with 
the distribution of the Anthropocene’s security effects. The Anthropocene 
incorporates intertwined drivers, each with dispersed and unequal effects that 
cannot be easily separated.
Take for instance the growing use of nitrogen to fertilise food crops. The flows 
of biogeochemicals like nitrogen and phosphorous are used as one of the 
control variables that make up their planetary boundaries framework (Steffen 
et al. 2015). These identified thresholds are used to show the capacity of the 
Earth system to persist in a Holocene-like state. Crossing the planet’s ‘safe 
operating spaces’ impacts the resilience of the system, leading eventually to 
global-level transitions. Nitrogen cycling has quite likely never been a topic 
that has interested security scholars. The growing availability of nitrogen, 
though, has been a major reason for the dramatic increase in food security for 
some countries and simultaneously posed increasing threats to human and 
ecosystem health. The world is at once too nitrogen-rich and nitrogen-poor. 
Embracing a caring sensibility in this instance would entail acknowledging 
nitrogen and other biogeochemical flows as Anthropocene security issues not 
by virtue of their potential to undermine global peace or community safety, but 
because they enact what Audra Mitchell terms ‘worldly notions of harm’, 
distributed across time, space, and worlds of being (Mitchell 2014). Certainly 
these flows affect the daily well-being of individuals (mostly in obtuse ways), 
but they also point to something more complex and ultimately unsettling; 
namely that security exists not as the liminal moment that divides safety from 
danger for a defined moral (human) community, but as a series of banal 
planetary functions made up of complex human and non-human 
assemblages.
The same experience can be applied to other markers of the Anthropocene – 
including the functioning of the oceans, climate change, or biosphere integrity. 
These are increasingly accepted as legitimate security concerns yet they are 
experienced narrowly, as glimpses that accord to dominant anthropocentric 
and instrumental abstractions. Using a sensibility of care, we might reverse 
this and give recognition to the complex, strange, and entangled natural 
entities rather than ignoring them or viewing them as adversaries, allies, or 
potential recipients of reciprocal forms of justice. 
This can be pursued in a number of different ways. Conventionally it means 
amplifying by whatever means available the injunction to care for the vibrant 
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and diverse security of earthly life that exists in relation to our own daily 
choices. According to William Connolly (2013, 131), the idea is to fold 
amplified versions of care into ‘operational patterns of desire, faith, will, 
identity, and self-interest, rather than to rise to a disinterested level entirely 
above the mundane worlds of desire, instrumentality, and politics.’ These 
patterns, which are already so prevalent in security thinking could be 
amended through cultivating micro-political interventions that can occur 
across individual and local scales to, for example, reflect on how food 
practices affect the efficiency of food systems and intersect with diverse forms 
of harm across lifeworlds. This could emphasise building the resilience of 
local food production by accepting lower yields in areas with high nitrogen 
pollution, while simultaneously increasing nitrogen use in sustainable ways in 
areas that are deprived (Biermann et al 2016). 
Finally, sensibilities of care also attune us to indigenous ontologies that have 
long emphasised the entangled needs of humans and non-humans within 
interdependent communities. For millennia indigenous thinkers have 
constructed and passed down through generations, interpretations of sentient 
environments that are enacted by the complex and lively relationships 
between people and non-human presences, including the climate, ancestors, 
water, and spirits.21 Take for instance the Tlatokan Atlahuak Declaration, from 
the Indigenous Peoples Parallel Forum of the Fourth World Water Forum in 
2006, which claimed that, ‘We have been placed upon this earth, each in our 
own traditional sacred land and territory to care for all of creation and water ... 
our traditional knowledge, laws and forms of life teach us to be responsible 
and caring for this sacred gift that connects all life’ (Third World Water Forum, 
quoted in Powys Whye and Cuomo 2016). In these cases responsibility is not 
solely the domain of humans, but felt by other worlds of being too. Water is 
not inert but holds its own forcefulness. Deborah McGregor, an Anishinaabe 
scholar and activist explains: 
Water has a role and a responsibility to fulfill, just as people 
do. We do not have the right to interfere with water’s duties to 
the rest of Creation. Indigenous knowledge tells us that water 
is the blood of Mother Earth and that water itself is considered 
a living entity with just as much right to live as we have. 
(McGregor 2009, 37–38, quoted in Powys Whyte and Cuomo 
2016, 8.) 
21  It is important not to homogenise distinct indigenous voices and traditions and to 
acknowledge the diversity of thought present in indigenous literatures. Indigenous 
philosophy emphasises the importance of place in knowledge production and avoid 
essentialist conceptions of pan-Indigenous philosophy (Sundberg 2014) 
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On its face the Anthropocene is a simple, almost intuitive idea. Since our 
earliest days, humans have altered local environments (Barnosky 2008). Yet, 
the Anthropocene is different. Of course it is monstrous in terms of its material 
consequences. On this alone, our understandings of security are challenged. 
Additionally, the Anthropocene concept compels us to acknowledge how 
security interacts with diverse lifeworlds that exist within, above, below, and 
around humans, acting in ways both pacific and threatening. Responding to 
this entails significant alterations to our security logics. This article argued 
that a care sensibility, one that is immeasurably old and yet fluid enough to 
adapt to our new world, can help us respond to the seemingly inescapable 
limits of planetary security despite the absence of any promise of reciprocity. 
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8
Global Security in a Posthuman 
Age? IR and the Anthropocene 
Challenge
DELF ROTHE
We have entered the age of the Anthropocene – a new geological epoch, 
which is defined by the human impact on planet Earth (Crutzen 2002; Steffen, 
Crutzen and McNeill and Steffen 2007; Zalasiewicz et al. 2011). This claim, 
initially made by geochemist and Nobel Prize laureate Paul Crutzen and 
popularised by several geologists and Earth scientists, is currently gaining 
traction in the critical literature in International Relations (IR). Drawing upon 
the reception of the Anthropocene concept by posthumanist or new materialist 
thinkers like Bruno Latour (2012; 2015) or Donna Haraway (2015), an 
increasing number of scholars are challenging established ontological 
concepts in IR, including geopolitics, security, or global governance (Dalby 
2013a; Fagan 2016; Harrington 2016; Harrington and Shearing 2016; Mayer 
and Schouten 2012; Mitchell 2014). Others even go so far as to announce the 
end of IR as a discipline (Agathangelou 2016, 330), which would be ‘[...] 
undone by the reality of the planet’ (Burke et al. 2016, 501). 
The existing IR literature on the Anthropocene takes the fact that humanity 
has become a telluric force like volcanism or tectonic plate movements as 
proof of a fundamental ontological flaw in dominant IR theories and concepts, 
i.e. the ‘bifurcation of nature’ (Latour 2015). A flawed distinction between the 
natural and the social worlds would, according to this critique, characterise all 
major IR theories (see e.g. Harrington in this volume; McDonald in this 
volume). The Anthropocene would instead prove that a clear distinction 
between nature and culture, between subject and object cannot be drawn. In 
the Anthropocene, the planet is actively interfering in human affairs, while 
humans at the same time have begun to transform the planet (Yusoff 2013, 
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2806). Classical approaches of geopolitics that would take the Earth (geo) as 
the stable environment, in which global power politics unfolds, would become 
inappropriate (Dalby 2013b, 39-40). Mainstream approaches of security 
would be equally problematic in the Anthropocene epoch. The very idea of a 
state securing its own territory from external threats or protecting its 
population from the contingencies of life (such as natural disasters, or 
diseases, etc.) is predicated upon ‘the separation of the human from an 
external nature’ (Fagan 2016, 8). Yet, even the critical literature on 
environmental or human security is accused of being guilty of reproducing the 
artificial divide between the natural and social worlds (Fagan 2016, 14-16). 
Either ‘the environment’ would be constructed as a referent object 
endangered by human activity or human communities would vice versa be 
portrayed as threatened by some external nature. Opposing these 
established concepts and theories, the Anthropocene literature holds that 
‘modern assumptions of nature as separate from humanity have never been 
accurate. The biosphere is a hybrid of the artificial and the natural’ (Dalby 
2013b, 40). Drawing on these theoretical reflections, the IR Anthropocene 
literature calls for a fundamental rethinking of security in terms of a ‘worldly 
approach to security’ (Mitchell 2014), ‘ecosystem resilience’ (McDonald in this 
volume), or security as an ‘ethos of care’ (Harrington in this volume).
From a different angle, a redefinition of security in posthumanist terms has 
been less welcomed. By proving the nature/culture divide – which is at the 
heart of the liberal enlightenment project – wrong, the Anthropocene literature 
would also do away with liberal aspirations of progress and promises of 
protection (Chandler 2013; Grove and Chandler 2016; Vrasti and Michelsen 
2016). Instead, the Anthropocene concept would promote a mere politics of 
adaptation and resilience, a form of post-politics, in which humans stop 
seeking transformation of their living conditions and instead accept their 
embeddeddness into fragile and crisis-prone socio-ecological systems (Evans 
and Reid 2014). In the age of the Anthropocene, it is argued, ‘The classic 
quest after the “good life”, once a starting point for both an art of living and 
the art of governing, is replaced by the more minimalist, almost realpolitik, 
striving for adaptive survival’ (Vrasti and Michelsen 2016, 4). 
In this contribution, I argue that both lines of argument – the affirmative and 
the critical literature on posthuman security in the Anthropocene – suffer from 
two related shortcomings. First, I hold that while the IR debate on the 
Anthropocene is strongly influenced by different strands of posthumanist and 
new materialist thought, the different theoretical traditions within this field and 
their implications for the understanding of the Anthropocene are seldom 
reflected. Posthumanism/new materialism has become a catchall term to 
denote any approach rejecting the nature/culture divide, including Actor-
Network-Theory (ANT), Object-Oriented-Ontology (OOO), vital materialism, or 
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critical posthumanism (see Kaltofen in this volume). This is problematic 
because, despite their common commitment to a post-Cartesian ontology, 
these approaches have quite distinct philosophical backgrounds and thus 
different ontological, epistemological and methodological implications (see 
also Cudworth and Hobden 2015). Second, in both the affirmative and the 
critical take on posthuman notions of security, the ‘advent of the 
Anthropocene’ (Hamilton et al., 5) and the assumption that it represents a 
fundamental rupture of our established anthropocentric theoretical concepts 
is simply taken for granted. In both literatures, there seems to be no doubt 
that we have entered a ‘posthuman age’ (Braidotti 2016, 33; Ferrando 2013, 
32). Thereby, the literature gives the impression that we would exactly know 
what this ‘new reality of the Anthropocene’ (McDonald in this volume) is and 
presents it as a single truth (a post-anthropocentric/post-humanist age) with a 
single set of normative implications: ‘The Anthropocene signals both the end 
of nature and the end of humanism’ (Grove and Chandler 2016, 6). 
In this contribution, I seek to sketch an alternative, sociological, account of 
security in the Anthropocene. This alternative approach starts from the 
assumption that the planetary crisis that we call the Anthropocene is 
inaccessible and withdrawn. Hence, an incredible amount of labour is 
required to render it visible and thinkable in the first place. My approach thus 
seeks to trace and map the assemblages or actor-networks, in which traces 
of the Anthropocene and resulting security risks become enacted through a 
multiplicity of practices and technologies (see also Rothe 2017). To develop 
this approach, the contribution starts by introducing and discussing two 
competing approaches that are often lumped together under the label of new 
materialism but in fact provide two almost oppositional perspectives on the 
question of how we can know the Anthropocene: ANT and OOO. In the third 
section, these two perspectives on the Anthropocene are related to the 
debate on Anthropocene security in IR. The fourth section sketches the 
contours of a sociological variant of Anthropocene security as alternative to 
the existing philosophical version that dominates the current debate in critical 
IR.
New Materialism between Object-Oriented-Ontology and Actor-Network-
Theory 
The accounts of new materialism and posthumanism in recent debates on 
security in International Relations are painted with a very broad brush stroke. 
Labels such as the ‘new material turn’ or the ‘posthuman turn’ are used to 
refer to a whole range of different theories from different disciplinary contexts 
and philosophical traditions, which sometimes even contradict each other. 
The only common ground of these heterogeneous approaches is the rejection 
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of anthropocentrism and a Cartesian worldview (see also Cudworth and 
Hobden 2015, 141; Kaltofen in this volume). In the following, I want to 
illustrate this claim by discussing and comparing two prominent approaches 
that are often lumped together under the label of new materialism but draw 
upon almost oppositional theoretical assumptions: Object-Oriented-Ontology 
(OOO) and Actor-Network-Theory (ANT).  
In the critical security literature, Object-Oriented-ontology (OOO) is quite 
often used synonymously to the broader label of ‘new materialism.’ In this 
perspective, OOO is equated with an approach of ‘[…] imagining the world 
from the view point of objects’ (Kaltofen in this volume). However, this narrow 
understanding of OOO ignores the philosophical implications that come along 
with the approach. For, OOOs proposition is not merely that we ‘need to stop 
trying to understand the world in terms of subject-object relations’ (Kaltofen in 
this volume). Rather, its point is to stop thinking of the world in relational ways 
in general: ‘It is necessary to staunchly defend the autonomy of objects or 
substances, refusing any reduction of objects to their relations, whether these 
relations be relations to humans or other objects’ (Bryant 2011, 26). For OOO, 
there is a virtual inner essence of things – an ontological surplus that is never 
completely actualised in an object’s relations to other objects. In OOO’s 
terms, this inner core can neither be perceived by human subjects nor by 
other objects with which they interact – objects are ‘withdrawn’ (Bryant 2011, 
26-31; Harman 2005). Here, OOO resembles the structuralist psychoanalysis 
of Jacques Lacan and his notion of the subject as ‘void’ (Žižek 2016, 66-69). 
For Lacan, the subject is never fully actualised – it is marked by a 
fundamental lack of identity, which can never be closed. For OOO ‘all objects 
are akin to Lacanian divided subjects’ (Žižek 2016, 69): objects are divided 
between their actual qualities in networks and their virtual inner core that only 
exists as potentiality but is never fully actualised. Thus, contingency is not just 
an epistemological problem – as a human incapability to grasp a complex 
reality, which is fully constituted – but an essentially ontological feature of 
objects themselves.
OOO, with its ‘deeply non-relational conception of the reality of things’ 
(Bennett 2012, 226), needs to be distinguished from relational ‘materialist’ 
theories such as ANT (see also Žižek 2016). In the IR literature ANT has been 
widely received in critical security works on security technologies such as 
drones, border control technologies, or algorithmic surveillance (see Kaltofen 
in this volume). Understood as an empirical version of poststructuralism – or 
as ‘material semiotics’ (Law 2009, 145-146) – ANT transfers the semiotic idea 
of the relational constitution of meaning to the material world. Challenging the 
classical semiotic distinction between the signifier and the signified it holds 
that any sign has a material dimension and any thing in the world is itself a 
sign. Things in the world receive their identity and meaning through their 
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associative relations to other elements in complex and fluid assemblages, or 
actor-networks (Latour 2005; Law 1999). Instead of viewing texts, images and 
other semiotic systems as representations of a pre-existing single reality, ANT 
shows how the interplay of expert practices, scientific discourses, 
technologies, and visuals constitute multiple realities (Hind and Lammes 
2016, 81-82). According to ANT-scholar Annemarie Mol, ontology ‘is not given 
in the order of things but [...] ontologies are brought into being, sustained, or 
allowed to wither away in common, day-to-day, sociomaterial practices’ (Mol 
2002, 6). Agency, in this understanding, is not linked to notions of human will 
or intention but is distributed across the human and non-human elements of 
actor-networks. Agency thus rests in the capability of making-a-difference in 
the world (Latour 2005). 
The crucial ontological differences between ANT and OOO are seldom 
acknowledged in the IR literature. OOO holds that objects are non-relational, 
withdrawn, and marked by their potentiality to be otherwise. For ANT, on the 
contrary, any thing in the world is real – and only real – insofar as it acts upon 
other things (Harman 2015). This is an ontology of pure immanence, in which 
things in the world are relationally constituted in situated practices. 
The described theoretical differences have important methodological 
implications. From an OOO perspective, the virtual inner core of objects – a 
potentiality that is never fully actualized – is not observable through the 
researcher. This assumption adds practices of speculation, mythical 
storytelling, practices of imagination and art as important ingredients of our 
endeavours to make sense of a phenomenon like the Anthropocene (Bryant, 
Srnicek and Harman 2011; Morton 2013). For ANT, on the contrary, the power 
of things rests in their ability to establish associative relations between 
heretofore unrelated phenomena (Cudworth and Hobden 2015, 444). A new 
technology such as a microscope or a satellite might enable novel ways of 
seeing the world, or altering the space-time of actor-networks thereby 
creating new affective relations between heretofore unrelated phenomena – 
e.g. between researchers and microbes. The core methodological position of 
ANT thus is empiricism (see Koddenbrock 2015). Careful participant 
observation – or the study of archives and secondary literature – is required 
to trace and study the relations of humans, non-humans, technologies, and 
discourses in situated practices and show how they relationally afford each 
other with identity and meaning. 
Security in the Anthropocene: Between Hyperobjects and Actor-
networks
At the heart of the existing IR literature on security in the Anthropocene are 
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two arguments: first, with the advent of the Anthropocene we are entering a 
new planetary reality, in which conditions of (human and non-human) life 
become radically altered and threatened (Burke et al. 2016, 506; Harrington 
2016, 481-482). Second, this new reality finally proves the inappropriateness 
of our theoretical conceptions and political institutions that were built for the 
Holocene and that drew upon a clear divide between the human and the 
natural world (Burke et al. 2016, 510; Fagan 2016, 13). This literature holds 
that the Anthropocene is more than a scientific (i.e. geological) concept. So, it 
is not simply a discursive or mental construction but has a material dimension 
and refers to a certain planetary reality (Harrington 2016, 482). I would agree. 
But what kind of thing (or object), then, is the Anthropocene exactly? How can 
we actually know it (and who is ‘we’)? What does it mean to be ‘in’ the 
Anthropocene? I would argue that these fundamental questions have been 
skipped in the unfolding IR literature on the Anthropocene.
I seek answers to these unasked questions from the perspective of the two 
theoretical approaches briefly described in the previous section. To address 
these questions from the perspective of OOO, it is helpful to take a closer 
look at Timothy Morton’s recent work on hyperobjects (Morton 2013). Morton 
transfers the ideas of OOO to the realm of ecology and tries to answer the 
question of how to make sense of complex and unruly objects like climate 
change. He proposes the notion of hyperobjects to refer to these objects, 
which are so widely distributed in time and space that they are omnipresent – 
i.e. it is not possible to escape them – but at the same time absent and 
withdrawn – in the sense that they elude perception and cognition (Morton 
2013, 1-3). According to Morton, hyperobjects, such as climate change, are 
interobjective, as they are constituted by the relations of several objects. 
Furthermore, they are nonlocal: while hyperobjects have concrete local 
impacts, their totality does never materialise locally (Morton 2013, 38). Thus, 
other objects (including humans) can experience hyperobjects only indirectly 
(for example, climate change can be experienced via local impacts or as 
rising ocean levels). Due to these characteristics, there will never be absolute 
scientific certainty about their existence. Thus, quite paradoxically, at a point 
of time when the impacts of climate change are being felt at more and more 
places in the world, also the amount of climate skepticism and denial is rising. 
The Anthropocene, then, could be understood as an epoch, which is marked 
by the rise of hyperobjects – or even as a meta-hyperobject, which is itself 
constituted by the interrelation of several hyperobjects including climate 
change, nuclear power, etc. The Anthropocene is thus equally totalising and 
withdrawn: the Anthropocene is a new planetary real – a state-shift of the 
entire Earth System that cannot be known or sensed directly and can hence 
only be addressed indirectly. It is thus no surprise that a whole range of art 
projects are emerging that try to capture the spectral phenomenon of the 
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Anthropocene in artefacts and artworks; and that the humanities are turning 
towards indigenous sources of spiritual and mythical knowledge to make 
sense of this new planetary real. If the Anthropocene is the age of 
hyperobjects that are unthinkable and withdrawn ‘[…] we need some other 
basis for making decisions about a future to which we have no real sense of 
connection’ (Morton 2010). Such a perspective is very much in line with the 
dominant reception of the Anthropocene in IR/Critical Security Studies. Here, 
the Anthropocene takes the form of a new planetary real – a dislocative 
moment that crucially challenges our established concepts and world views. 
This literature identifies ‘alternative’ sources of knowledge, for example in 
spiritual, indigenous (i.e. premodern) conceptions of the world (see Mitchell in 
this volume). 
What this perspective ignores, however, is the incredible amount of labour 
required to render the Anthropocene’s traces visible and sizable in the first 
place (Wark 2015a). For, as Slavoj Zizek reminds us ‘[…] We do not only miss 
an appropriate language but also an approbative sensation-experience of this 
world’ (Žižek 2016, 44) I am following here McKenzie Wark (2014), who 
points to the vast posthuman assemblage of satellites, weather stations, 
computer simulations, researchers, mechanisms of international cooperation, 
which renders hyperobjects like climate change visible, sizable or calculable 
in the first place (see Edwards 2010; Wark 2015b, 166-182). This is where we 
(re-)enter ANT turf: unlike for OOO, for Latour and other ANT scholars, Gaia 
does not exist until it becomes woven into our conception of the world 
(Harman 2015). To become ‘matter-real’ and ‘matter-ing’ (Moser 2008, 99) the 
Anthropocene needs to be enacted by complex actor-networks of planetary 
dimensions: scientific practices and technologies such as satellite earth 
observation or stratigraphic research render the material traces of the 
Anthropocene visible (van Munster and Sylvest 2016, 4-10). Discursive and 
aesthetic practices of scientists, writers, activists and artists weave these 
traces into broader meaningful narratives of the Earth — or ‘geostories’ 
(Bonneuil 2015, 17). 
I would thus follow Sam Randalls (2015) who argues that ‘the Anthropo(s)
cene is thoroughly multiple.’ This implies that competing versions of the 
Anthropocene exist, each accompanied with a different set of policy and 
ethical conclusions. This is my main point of critique of the existing IR 
literature on security in the Anthropocene: it takes the Anthropocene as a 
fixed and given phenomenon, which is used to develop a single set of 
normative arguments about the redefinition of core concepts in IR like 
security or geopolitics. 
Just as Wark (2015a) claims that OOO ‘occludes the ways in which objects 
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are known in the first place,’ the IR literature on the Anthropocene occludes 
the ways in which the Anthropocene can be known. Wark holds that this 
‘mystification’ is unfolding in three steps: firstly, knowledge of an object is 
produced by a whole range of human and non-human practices; secondly, 
these practices are generalised in the form of images and metaphors; thirdly, 
the original labour that was required to construct these metaphors is erased: 
‘the metaphor will then be claimed to be what precedes all those other steps 
when it is actually a later derivation’ (Wark 2015a). In the IR literature on the 
Anthropocene, the same happens: the Anthropocene becomes an abstracted 
imagery, a massive metaphor, in which all the labour required to produce it in 
the first place becomes black-boxed. The image of the Anthropocene is then 
taken as evidence of the hubris of our discipline as well as previous human 
attempts to deal with the climate crisis. For example, Harrington (2016, 479) 
proposes to understand the Anthropocene as a new defining marker of IR. 
However, as the heated debate on the start date of the Anthropocene in 
Geology and the Earth Sciences reminds us, we might have been in the 
Anthropocene for several hundreds or even thousands of years – so, how can 
this epoch reasonably represent a temporal marker for IR? The deployment of 
the Anthropocene as a metaphor becomes apparent in the ambiguous ways, 
in which the term Anthropocene is deployed: The notions of ‘the 
Anthropocene,’ ‘the Anthropocene concept’ or the ‘Anthropocene imaginary’ 
are used alternatively – sometimes within one and the same article (Grove 
and Chandler 2016, 1-4). So, it becomes unclear what actually challenges our 
conceptions of the world: is it the Anthropocene itself (but how do we know 
this withdrawn thing?), or some of its more visible footprints and traces (but 
how are these becoming visible in the first place)? Or is it a certain discourse, 
concept or imaginary is challenging our human hubris? 
Towards a Sociological Variant of Anthropocene Security
I want to use the remainder of this contribution to make a proposal for an 
alternative version of security in the Anthropocene. Firstly, rather than taking 
the Anthropocene and its security implications as a given starting point of a 
theoretical/philosophical discussion of security, this alternative version 
addresses the Anthropocene as an open question. It stresses the 
unknowability of the Anthropocene (and its security implications) and the 
incredible amount of labour and practice required to render it intelligible. 
Instead of discussing the question of how security in the Anthropocene should 
look like, such an approach asks how security practices in the Anthropocene 
actually look like. Identifying itself as a sociological version of Anthropocene 
security, the approach holds that neither do security risks in the Anthropocene 
simply exist out there, nor are they reducible to mere discursive constructions 
or mental concepts. Rather, they become ‘matter-real’ through a whole 
multiplicity of practices in socio-technological networks. These comprise 
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remote sensors, computing power, simulation models, media, researchers, 
and many other things that together render traces of the Anthropocene and 
their security implications visible (Edwards 2010; McQuillan 2016; van 
Munster and Sylvest 2016). Such risks become ‘matter-real’ as computer 
models, risk maps, statistical probabilities, satellite images, future scenarios, 
or colourful data visualizations (Jasanoff 2004; Schneider and Nocke 2014). 
The approach thus holds that the technosphere – just like the geosphere, 
biosphere or the hydrosphere – is part of the Anthropocene and that forms of 
securing in the Anthropocene are inherently digital (HKW 2016). It seeks to 
trace and map the actor-networks that emerge through the increasing 
cooperation of security officials, environmental researchers, NGOs strategic 
think-tanks, technology and data start-ups around concepts such as 
complexity, resilience, or big data.
Secondly, I agree with Sam Randalls (2015, 330) that the Anthropocene is 
always multiple and thus ‘[…] should not be taken to inspire a singular 
scientific, political or ethical view.’ Exactly this is happening in the existing 
literature on security in the Anthropocene, which holds that the Anthropocene 
forces us to rethink our core concepts and institutions of security. Here, it 
often appears as if the overcoming of the nature/culture divide would already 
be a political act. Accepting our embeddeddness within the Earth System 
would allow for the development of a new sensitivity for our non-human co-
inhabitants on this planet (see Grove and Chandler 2016, 7). By turning a 
vitalist materialist or posthumanist ontology into a political project one, 
however, risks re-essentialising the carefully deconstructed nature/culture 
divide (Luke 2016, 7). The Anthropocene, then, risks becoming another 
version of ‘green ideology’ (Stavrakakis 1997), in which ‘the environment’ as a 
core nodal point is replaced with Gaia or the Earth System. Similar to earlier 
forms of green ideology, posthuman conceptions of security in the IR 
literature carry the promise of a certain fullness-to-come once the human 
subject becomes fully embedded into and immersed within the socio-
ecological Earth System (or local socio-ecological systems).
Starting from the notion of multiple Anthropocenes, on the contrary, I would 
propose a more empirical approach that describes the different security 
projects in the Anthropocene, each dealing with different security threats and 
governance problems, and unfolding within different social/ecological/
technical assemblages. For example, a particularly prominent version of the 
Anthropocene understands it in (post-) apocalyptical terms (Bonneuil 2015, 
27-28) as ‘disaster to end all disasters’ (Clark 2014, 21). Linking up with 
earlier forms of environmental eschatology, and organised around prominent 
boundary objects such as the ‘planetary boundaries’ concept (Steffen et al. 
2015) such imaginaries help reinforce post-political forms of governance 
around the notion of resilience. In line with Lovelock’s prediction of the 
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‘revenge of Gaia’ (Lovelock 2006), the planet here becomes enacted as a 
pathological Earth – a disequilibrium stage of the Earth System, posing non-
linear and unpredictable risks for life on the planet (Grove and Chandler 
2016, 7). As shocks, disasters or catastrophes can never be ruled-out, the 
lesson is that the socio-ecological systems at risk must become resilient 
themselves (Evans and Reid 2014). In other actor-networks Gaia becomes 
instead enacted as an enormous laboratory available for human 
experimentation and control. Post-environmentalists such as the members of 
the Californian Breakthrough Institute are dreaming of a future, in which 
humans self-consciously acknowledge their agency as a geological force and 
– ‘as pilots of a hybrid techno-nature’ (Bonneuil 2015, 25) – begin steering 
spaceship Earth into desired directions. Numerous research projects on 
different types of geoengineering all around the world are already exploring 
the options for intentional modifications of the Earth System (Yusoff, 2013). At 
the same time, businesses and government projects are increasingly trying to 
harness the power of technologies such as big data, artificial intelligence, 
smart devices and the internet of things for ecological modernization projects 
(Luke 2016, 10). 
Thirdly, I want to make an argument against the aspiration to fully overcome 
the subject/object divide (Chagani 2014; see also Mitchell in this volume). 
The existing literature on security in the Anthropocene seems to imply that 
there is no alternative between the Cartesian ideal of a fully constituted, self-
conscious human subject, on the one hand, and a completely flat ontology, in 
which no distinction between subject and object exists, on the other. 
Following David Howarth (2013) and Slavoj Žižek (2016) I want to argue that 
there is in fact the possibility of a ‘third way’ between these two extreme 
positions. This third way does not understand the subject as the fully 
constituted self-conscious human being that Descartes had described. 
Instead, subjectivity refers to a form of self-identity that is marked by a 
constitutive lack-of-fullness. The subject is a void in the signifying structure – 
a form of self-identity that is entirely relational depending on the symbolic 
structure into which it is thrown (Howarth 2013, 158; Žižek 2016, 58-59). 
Subjectivity, then, is not reserved to human individuals, but can as well refer 
to collective forms of identity that include both human and non-human 
elements. Following this interpretation, the Anthropocene could indeed 
become a crucial moment of dislocation that might be turned into radical 
forms of political agency and mobilised for a reconceptualization of our very 
concepts of security and politics. Yet, for this, we need to preserve the idea of 
political subjectivity. For, it can only be a political project that involves human 
actors, that could develop a vision of an alternative post-capitalist future 
around a set of core political demands and build a coalition of human and 
non-human members powerful enough to challenge the existing hegemony of 
global carboniferous capitalism and the discourses and practices of security 
that help sustain it.
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The ‘Nature’ of International 
Relations: From Geopolitics to 
the Anthropocene
OLAF CORRY
International Relations (IR) has been criticised for its exclusively human 
perspective and for having ‘been little concerned with the vast variety of other, 
non-human populations of species and “things”’ (Cudworth and Hobden 2013, 
644). One aim of post-humanist work is to find a way of including the natural 
world in a meaningful way into IR theory and analysis (see Kaltofen this 
volume). This is a challenge, but perhaps not an insurmountable one. After 
all, the discipline has roots in geopolitical analysis of how geography and 
climates affect world politics. The brief ‘natural history of IR’ that follows is 
necessarily a broad-brush depiction of how IR has (not) theorised and 
analysed the natural world in various ways (Corry and Stevenson 2017b). It 
shows that IR, although similar to sociology that became ‘radically 
sociological’ (Buttel 1996, 57), is not immune to concern for the natural world, 
but also that there is a long track record of either reifying or ignoring it. The 
chapter concludes by considering how best to proceed in developing an IR as 
if the Earth matters.
Geopolitics and Nature
IR has some of its deepest disciplinary roots in considerations about 
geography. As Daniel Deudney pointed out, whereas ‘recent literature 
typically casts nature as a new factor in politics, the idea that nature is a 
powerful force shaping human political institutions is extremely old’ (1999 25-
6). For Aristotle, climate and agricultural aspects of territory were behind the 
rise and spread of empires while Montesquieu argued that Asia and Europe 
had different political systems because of their geographies and modern 
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writers have taken up similar physiopolitical themes (Diamond 1997; Crosby 
2015[1986]). For Alexis de Tocqueville, nature itself was a factor in American 
democracy: ‘it is not only legislation that is democratic; nature itself works for 
the people’; God had given them ‘the means of remaining equal and free, by 
placing them upon a boundless continent’ conveniently isolated from the 
anarchy of European inter-state relations (Tocqueville 2000, 267). 
The ‘geopolitics’ tradition that emerged from around 150 years ago among 
European geographers, put the natural world at the centre of their analysis of 
world politics (see Haslam 2002, 162-182). This emerged in turn out of a 
shifting mix of geography, demographics, evolutionary ideas, racial theory and 
realist doctrine (Bashford 2014). In Britain, Halford J. Mackinder argued that 
geography, having charted the entire globe, then had to move on to analyse 
how humans live in and on the land and seas (1904). Best known for his 
Heartland Thesis – the idea that the central Eurasian landmass is the key to 
world domination – Mackinder saw land power as superior to sea power, 
reasoning that navies needed ports and docks to be built and operated from. 
In contrast, for Alfred Mahan, the sea presented itself ‘as a great highway’ 
that was until recently much easier to move on than land (Mahan 1890, 34). 
But for Mackinder the Heartland was impenetrable from the icy north and 
desert-covered south and mainly accessible to the west. This meant that the 
central drama of geopolitics was between Germans expanding East and 
Slavs in Eastern Europe who were in their way and competing for control of 
the ‘pivot area’. Eurasia was effectively the ‘pivot’ of history.
Figure 1: Halford J. Mackinder’s Heartland Theory map, as published in 1904
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This cast nature as an anchor or determinant of international affairs. The 
Swedish geographer Rudolf Kjellén was the first to use the term ‘geopolitics’ 
in 1899, while German geographer Joseph Ratzel suggested he was 
conducting ‘anthro-geographical’ studies. With the term Lebensraum Ratzel 
aimed to describe how dynamic populations and states required space and 
resources, driving international conflict on a finite – and by that time fully 
charted – globe. Inspired by Darwinian and Malthusian thought, most 
infamously, geopolitics was appropriated instrumentally by the Nazis with the 
German geographer and general Karl Haushofer directly influencing Rudolf 
Hess with geopolitical ideas. 
Geopolitics emphasised nature as a factor in world politics, but not as part of 
a vulnerable web of life. Rather, nature provided resources and a physical 
backdrop or stage upon which vigorous racial groups and nations engaged in 
struggles for power and resources. Thus nature, in pre-war geopolitics, is 
conceived of in firmly anthropocentric as well as state-centric terms as either 
a facilitator or hindrance to geopolitical expansion or defence of human 
groups.
Human nature 
This changed with the advent of the modern post-WWII disciplinary IR. 
Geography as a determinant of politics fell into serious intellectual disrepute. 
Often labelled a ‘classical realist’, Hans Morgenthau in Politics Among 
Nations, declared geopolitics to be ‘a pseudoscience erecting the factor of 
geography into an absolute that is supposed to determine the power, and 
hence the fate, of nations’ (Morgenthau 1985, [1948], 174). Geography, 
Morgenthau admitted, could give ‘one aspect of the reality of national power’ 
but amounted to a ‘distortion’ (ibid.) on its own, especially when fused with 
virulent nationalism. Even today, geopolitics has to deflect suspicions and 
claim ‘misappropriation’ during the interwar years (Kaplan 2009, 61), some 
suggesting that the term geopolitik be used for the German interwar variant 
(Sicker 2010, 5).
In most accounts of classical realism, the main aspect of nature still taken 
seriously is human nature. In Morgenthau’s ‘Six Principles of Political 
Realism’ the first is that ‘politics is governed by objective laws that have their 
roots in human nature’ (1985 [1948], 4). These laws had not changed ‘since 
the classical philosophies of China, India and Greece’ (ibid.) and finding and 
adhering to them meant accurately identifying human nature (rather than 
nature itself). On this account, the vast planes and mountain ranges of Asia 
were swapped for the mental schemata and drives of Homo Sapiens in 
general, and of statesmen (sic) in particular. Foreign policy should be guided 
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by the concept of ‘interest defined in the terms of power’. This depended, in 
turn, on ‘the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is 
formulated’ (ibid., 11). 
Realism never relinquishes the issue of resources and territory, but they seem 
by now already to be subordinate to politics, interests and historical 
conjunctions that allowed these to take shape. Morgenthau is at pains not to 
reduce politics to anything else, including geography: ‘Intellectually, the 
political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the 
economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs’ (ibid., 13). Critical of social 
science scientism, Morgenthau also objected to how ‘geopolitics endeavoured 
to put foreign policy as a whole on a scientific basis’ (1964, 94). Science itself 
was in any case not objective: even physicists viewed their ‘own external 
world in a way which I can only describe as mystical’, he commented (ibid., 
134). Sounding like a modern constructivist Morgenthau argued that ‘(n)ature 
as the object of human knowledge is, therefore, somehow the product of 
human action’ (Ibid., 141).
At the same time, post-war Realism was an incubator of, if not a strong sense 
of nature, then other expressions of materialism. Technology and economics 
were considered important mediators of power. In particular, Morgenthau, 
John Herz and others recognised that the nuclear revolution changed some 
foundational calculations of political order and conflict. Human appropriated 
forces of nature – technology – had become a significant condition for power 
politics. For some this also suggested a need to re-code some core realist 
ethics (van Munster and Sylvest 2016): going beyond concern for the national 
interest, ‘global realist’ thinking took as its point of departure the ‘material 
existence of the globe as a single physical and sociopolitical space’ (ibid, 10). 
Nature and Modern IR Theory
However, by the time IR had moved beyond the first ‘Great Debate’ between 
realists and (imagined) idealists, to debates about scientific method and 
‘rigor’, nature disappeared even further from view. If Morgenthau insisted on 
the irreducibility of politics, Kenneth Waltz and the neo-realists worked to 
establish the autonomy of the international from the rest of politics. Waltz’ 
epistemological stance told him that ‘in reality everything is connected to 
everything else’ (Waltz 1979, 8), but also that scientific models should isolate 
an element of reality in order to render it amenable to analysis. A theory of 
international politics would therefore abstract from complexity (and hence 
history) and focus on regularities and structure. 
With neorealism, the structure of international politics became a disembodied 
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product of multiple competing units, irrespective of national cultures, 
geography or statesmen. Waltz had effectively airbrushed the physical 
backdrop to geopolitics away revealing an abstract neorealist formalism 
(Corry and Stevenson 2017a). Maps of the globe (see Figure 1) were 
replaced with schematic model representations (see figure 2).
Figure 2: Waltz’s model of the international system
‘Capabilities’ lingered as the strongest link in neo-realism back to a material 
sense of place and time: a state takes on the role of a pole in the system if it 
has relatively many capabilities including ‘the size of population and territory, 
resource endowment, economic capacity, military strength, political stability 
and competence’ (Waltz 1979, 131). But each state also became ‘functionally 
equivalent’, as each one had to solve essentially the same dilemmas. Hence, 
nature was ignored, or reduced to fungible resources of power. 
Notwithstanding occasional references to geography e.g. ‘the stopping power 
of water’ (Mearsheimer), for neorealists, ‘place’ became a function of 
economics, military strength and political affiliation.
Neoliberal Institutionalism, the main rival to neo-realism during the 1980s and 
1990s, evolved out of functionalist and liberal traditions and was part of the 
effort to make IR into a social science. With its focus on rational actors, 
institutions, rules and incentives rather than place, history or drives, the 
physical and natural world became, if anything, even more consistently 
occluded from view. In Karl Deutsch’s cybernetic approach, communication 
and ‘systems of decisions, regulation and control’ replaced ‘drives’ and 
‘instincts’ as explanatory factors in international relations (Deutsch 1969 
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[1963], 77). Later, notions such as ‘complex interdependence’ (Keohane and 
Nye 1977) challenged realist nostrums but offered no alternative view of the 
natural world’s place in international politics. ‘Environment’ and ‘population’ 
were cursorily included as examples of complex interdependence (Keohane 
and Nye 1977, 26) but most examples were drawn from the field of 
economics (Moravscik 2009, 245). Multinational firms, other non-state actors 
and inequalities worldwide were thought to be among the factors changing 
the basic codes of world politics undermining the distinctness of the units 
(states) and the high politics/low politics distinction that made up the basis of 
the realist states-in-anarchy model. 
Liberalism has a strong human-centric impulse (although the transformative 
potential of technology has also been a theme in this tradition – see Deudney 
2006, 193-214 for a summary of ‘liberal historical materialism’). When ‘neo-
liberal institutionalism’ emerged taking on board neo-realist notions of 
anarchy and state-centrism as well as a rational decision-maker model, the 
natural stage upon which rational state action and institution-building played 
out is perhaps implicitly assumed, but as such it is invisible. At least nature no 
longer figures in explanations or predictions of potential shifts or stability in 
world hegemony (Keohane 1984). Similarly, formal modelling in a rational-
actor paradigm operates with disembodied ‘social actors’ and ‘decision-
makers’, although, again, these may have access to ‘resources’. The main 
determinant of actions is ‘preferences’ and ‘information’ (e.g. Keohane and 
Ostrom 1995). 
Outside the two leading paradigms, Marxism of course had materialism as a 
founding tenet, and this remains the case in much contemporary IR theorists 
drawing on Marx – although a portion of Western Marxism with Lukács 
explicitly rejected a ‘dialectics of nature’ reserving dialectics to history and 
society (Foster 2013). In practice, post-Marxist IR-approaches have focused 
on economic structures, dependency in terms of social and economic 
development and overarching ‘world systems’ (Wallerstein 1974). 
Alternatively, hegemonic projects anchored in (currently neoliberal) forms of 
social organization and ideology (Cox 1981) have taken analytical 
precedence over analysis of human interaction with nature directly (Mészáros 
1970). 
Uneven and Combined Development theory has recently been developed and 
has touched at times on the role of natural features of regions and countries 
in establishing and perpetuating unevenness (Rosenberg 2013) – or on these 
and the role of non-human (but highly social) factors such as pandemics 
(Anievas and Nisancioglu 2015, 81-82). Neither nature nor human nature 
here are considered a-historical quantities, yet neither is subsumed under 
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‘national interests’ or abstracted away via rational decisionism. Historical 
materialist method thus has perhaps the most immediate potential in terms of 
providing theoretical apparatus for including nature in IR and allowing for 
analysis of dialectical relations between nature and human societies (see 
below). 
Constructivist and post-structuralist approaches arrived just as Marxist 
perspectives faltered towards and after the end of the Cold War. Reflectivist 
approaches were opposed to rationalism, but did little to change the 
marginalization of ‘nature’ in IR. Alexander Wendt advanced a predominantly 
idealist and social constructivist view of international relations, though he 
reserved a space for ‘rump materialism’ (Wendt 1999, 110). The latter 
included ‘human nature, a weak version of technological determinism and 
geography/natural resources’ (Guzzini and Leander 2006, 78) although this, 
Wendt admitted, was relatively inconsequential for his theoretical setup 
(Wendt 1999, 136). Post-structuralism with its focus on discourses and 
structures of signification ventured further down the anti-materialist route, 
eradicating the ‘rump’ of materialism, albeit in terms of epistemology more 
than ontology. Commonly post-structuralists do not deny the existence of ‘the 
external world’ – external to discourse – but materiality takes on a shadowy 
existence as an essentially unknowable entity that is accessible and effective 
only through signification and social institutions which are typically imbued 
with language and meaning rather than matter. 
Nature as ‘Environment’
Instead, nature reappears in IR from around the 1970s, not as a constitutive 
factor underpinning world politics but in the guise of ‘the environment’ – as an 
issue or problem to be managed (Corry and Stevenson 2017a). This partly 
reflects the way it appeared. While military-related technologies such as 
satellites, space-travel and climate models prepared the way, environmental 
issues such as climate change were pushed by scientists, international 
organizations and popular environmental movements worried about 
environmental limits (Edwards 2010). 
This inserted a different, but still firmly anthropocentric, view of nature into IR 
with a ‘separation of the ‘human’ from other species, natures and entities’ 
(Cudworth and Hobden 2013, 643). While it stimulated analysis and 
theorising, it did not initially bring the natural world into the IR theories 
themselves. The collective action-framing of environmental problems was a 
major impetus to the formulation of regime theory, but this focused on 
principles, rules, norms and procedures (e.g. Krasner 1982; Young 1989). 
‘Regime complexes’ – overlapping institutions and norms that are formally 
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distinct but functionally linked – were similarly prompted by analysis of the 
patchwork of climate change institutions and norms (Raustiala and Victor 
2004; Keohane and Victor 2011). Environmental issues also provided a major 
occasion for the ‘epistemic communities’ literature to enter International 
Relations (Adler and Haas, 1992) and new global challenges such as ozone 
depletion and other cases that suggested a prominent role for scientific 
knowledge in international politics have more recently inspired more 
interaction with Science and Technology Studies (STS) (Beck and Forsyth 
2017). 
Meanwhile ‘the environment’ also became a feature of realist lineage. This 
can be seen notably in debates about environmental security (Homer-Dixon 
1994; Dalby 2002) and resource scarcity and conflict (see Jan Selby 2014 for 
a critique). More recently this debate has been framed in terms of ‘climate 
security’ (see McDonald 2013 for an overview). Securitization Theory was 
developed partly to accommodate environmental ‘referent objects’ of security 
(Wæver 1995) and recent expansions of the Copenhagen School of security 
studies seek to encompass ‘macro-securitizations’ that arise from global risks 
such as climate change (Buzan and Wæver 2009). Recently English School 
writers have begun considering whether environmental stewardship is 
gradually becoming a ‘primary institution’ of international society and 
sovereignty (Falkner 2017).
The New Geopolitics and the Anthropocene
At the same time, the geopolitics of old is having something of a renaissance. 
Reconnecting directly to the pre-war geopolitics, writers such as Robert 
Kaplan announced the ‘revenge of geography’ (2009) and Patrick Porter has 
sought to dispel the ‘myth of the global village’ (2015). For both – and other 
post-classical realists (see Brooks 1997), the overall argument is that world 
politics is still underpinned by geography that conditions the ease or difficulty 
projecting power, even given the technological innovations such as the 
Internet and aviation. Globalization and technological changes modulate the 
significance of geography, but they do not negate it. Mackinder and the others 
were ‘misused’ by the Nazis, they say (Kaplan 2013, 61), to fashion a crude 
determinism, and the baby was thrown out with the bathwater. 
More problematically, related ideas are currently espoused by Alexandr 
Dugin, a neofascist Russian sociologist who has advised amongst others the 
speaker of the Russian Duma. Dugin claims also to draw on the work of 
Mackinder, Kjellén and other geopolitical thinkers but espouses the view that 
the strategic aim for Russia should be to head a Eurasian empire, carve up 
Central Asia and Europe with an expanded Germany, while destabilising and 
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undermining the Atlanticist US-led world order. Allegedly influential in 
Moscow, Dugin recommends using all means available including (cyber-)
subversion and war against the West (Dunlop 2004; d’Ancona 2016).
But while reintroducing geography, this literature neither engages the 
‘environmental’ question, nor the planetary ethics of the ‘nuclear realists’, 
casting some doubt also on the transformative power of technologies. 
Mackinder, Ratzel and Kjellén focused on the implications of geophysical 
structures for world politics - not the other way around. Humans are 
connected to it in so far as it provides resources or erects barriers to power. 
Others outside IR, notably critical geographers have long viewed geography 
as something mediated by social institutions, histories and discourses (O’ 
Tuathail and Agnew 1992). Simon Dalby has suggested that what is needed 
is an Anthropocence geopolitics. The politics of knowing and governing 
geophysical systems of the planet is a different problem to the classical one 
of navigating power politics: ‘(g)eopolitics is no longer just about playing the 
great game of state rivalry; it is also now literally about remaking the playing 
field’ as the ice caps melt and the climate heads for a new, hotter equilibrium 
state: ‘the current geopolitics is determining the future climate of the planet. 
Political and business leaders are effectively deciding whether there will be 
polar ice caps on the planet a couple of centuries from now’ (2014, 3). 
Similarly, Earth Systems Governance literature explores how dynamic and 
vulnerable natural systems and ‘planetary boundaries’ can be negotiated 
(Biermann 2014; Rockström et al. 2009). STS has made an impact on IR too 
(Acuto and Curtis 2014; Beck and Forsyth 2017), though its wariness of grand 
theory puts a limit on this. 
This covers some international issues, but more fundamentally, how should 
canonical categories in IR such as sovereignty, anarchy and balance of power 
be re-thought in an Anthropocene age (Corry 2016)?
Nature/Human: Synthesis or Dialectics?
There are of course numerous ways to go about answering such a puzzle. To 
simplify, some proceed by blurring the distinction between the human and the 
non-human (Kaltofen, this volume) or between social and natural. For 
instance, Audra Mitchell has suggested the term ‘worldly security’ 
encompassing the physical, built environment and cultures of human 
communities (2014) and she draws on Isabelle Stenger’s notion of 
‘cosmopolitics’ according to which ‘human and nonhuman, living and non-
living, organic and inorganic — can intervene in politics by ‘forcing thought’ 
through their effects, properties, presence or absence’ (Mitchell 2016, 17). 
Some STS approaches including Actor-Network Theory would tend to point in 
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a similar direction using the concepts of ‘actant’ and ‘assemblage’ to indicate 
a hybrid ontology of natural and social systems (Latour 1990; see also Acuto 
and Curtis 2014). 
Other critical posthuman approaches do, however, emphasise the continuing 
importance of boundaries between humans and nonhumans, but aim to 
specify the ‘embeddedness’ of humans in the non-human: ‘We need to take 
analytic account of both differences and distinctions as well as the ways in 
which beings and things (including ourselves, of course) are co-constituted’ 
(Cudworth and Hobden 2013, 644). 
Breaking down the analytical distinction between human and non-human, the 
challenge is to not subsume one under the other: either risk treating all 
natural systems as pliable and socially constructed; or treating social life as 
simply a subset of the natural world, rendered from the same matter and 
subject to the same (scientific) methods of knowing. With James Lovelock’s 
(once-controversial, now less so) Gaia-theory, the Earth is considered one 
single self-regulating organism, and humans can potentially be dispensed 
with as a result of Anthropocene changes, or could possibly survive and act 
as Gaia’s ‘brain’ (Lovelock 2009, 248). Just as anthropocentrism renders the 
natural world incidental to analysis, Lovelock’s eco-centrism recognises that 
human society is dispensable to the Earth (Lovelock 2006).
The other strategy is to maintain that humans and society on the one hand, 
and natural systems on the other, deserve their own terminologies and 
theories. Although they are increasingly linked – and in the Anthropocene 
inextricably so – they represent different analytical logics and are best 
theorised as such. Here the major challenge is then to specify in a 
satisfactory manner how they relate to each other. This can be as distinct but 
interlinked entities or spheres, or perhaps in terms of dialectics between 
humans and nature: one conditions and transforms the other, which in turn 
acts back upon the first in its new form, recreating the point of departure for 
the next historical and iterative development. 
While new materialism is promising, an ‘old materialism’ emphasising the 
dialectics of nature and history should also be explored more fully. Marx put 
nature, and human interaction with it, right at the centre of a historical social 
theory (Foster 2000). Production and technology mediated between humans 
and nature, with the latter two conditioning the other as well as technology: 
‘For Marx, human beings transformed their relation to nature but not exactly 
as they pleased; they did so in accordance with conditions inherited from the 
past and as a result of a complex process of historical development that 
reflected a changing relation to a natural world, which was itself dynamic in 
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character’ (Foster 1999, 390).  Uneven and Combined Development theory 
inserts a specifically international dimension into these dialectics (Rosenberg 
2013). 
But dialectical method is not confined to Marxism. The transformation of the 
natural world that the ‘Anthropocene’ captures, and the transformation of the 
human that ‘post-humanism’ aims for, could be considered two sides of an 
accelerating dialectic. This requires some explications that are beyond this 
essay.  But even in more prosaic terms, there is a dialectical interchange 
implied in some existing interpretations of environment and security. In Ole 
Wæver’s seminal essay securitization/desecuritization the environment is just 
one of several possible ‘valued referent objects’ of security, i.e. which is 
threatened and requiring exceptional means to defend it (1995). This keeps 
the environment ontologically separate yet implicated in the political logic of 
‘security’. That logic itself in turn grew out of specific historical conditions after 
the end of WWII (Wæver 1995). In dialectical terms the story does not stop 
there, either. Articulations of environmental security might be transforming the 
logic of security anew (Trombetta 2008). In this volume, Matt McDonald 
considers the idea of ‘ecological security’ (2016) as a way of moving beyond 
anthropocentric notions of environmental security. This clearly involves more 
than applying a familiar notion of security to the biosphere, requiring instead a 
new idea of security. Which again provides the basis for a new understanding 
of ‘environment’, and so forth. 
Although IR is a thoroughly anthropocentric discipline, nature has featured 
prominently, albeit quite differently and sporadically. From the physiopolitics of 
the Greeks, via European geopolitics to the more recent global environmental 
politics, this legacy bears remembering while we search for a stronger sense 
of materiality and a framework for accounting for the natural world in IR 
theory. The post-war rationalist and constructivist paradigms perhaps 
marginalised nature most starkly. Classical realists engage with territory and 
technology but with the ascent of a social scientific epistemology, geopolitics 
and historical materialism marginalised. The concept of ‘the environment’ 
involved a pigeonholing of nature, which became, at best, a human collective 
action problem. 
The challenge now is to find a way forward that does not simply revive 
geography as a condition of great power competition, but rather one that 
grapples with an Anthropocene IR: how do we rethink IR for a world where 
humanity, the international system and the Earth’s current ecology are 
mutually transformative – and potentially mutually destructive? If the main 
thrust of post-humanism and political ecology has been to deconstruct the 
distinction between human and non-human, alternative modes – such as 
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viewing the relationship as a dialectical one – deserve more systematic 
attention. Although, in the end, both will doubtless be necessary if there is to 
be a discipline of IR as if the Earth mattered (Corry and Stevenson 2017b). 
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Metternich, The Gut-Brain 
Axis, and the Turing Cops: The 
Subjects of Posthuman IR
DARIAN MEACHAM
Is a Posthuman World a World without Human-subjectivity?
Approaching the relation between posthumanism and international relations 
(IR) from some disciplinary distance, there seem, at first pass, fewer more 
awkward intellectual travelling companions. The very idea of a nation is to a 
large extent tied up historically and epistemologically with the idea of the 
human being, and more precisely the human subject of the human sciences. 
More specifically, nations are social institutions that are constituted by 
conscious, active, and supposedly autonomous human subjects who identify 
with the nation in a reciprocal process of institutional reinforcement creating 
in the process both the nation and national-subjects. Whether one adheres to 
a primordialist positon that modern nation-states are founded upon proto-
national communities or a modernist one that the socio-economic conditions 
of the industrial age created a need for a new political form, the nation-state, 
and a new political subject, the national citizen, it is the case that modern 
nations are institutions that require speaking, remembering, interacting 
subjects, in other words, subjects that navigate the world like us. That’s not to 
say that other forms of political life are not possible for human-subjects, they 
obviously are, but rather that there seems to be a special relation and 
perhaps one of dependency between nations and certain types of subjects. 
And in gratitude for their existence the nation-state provides these newly 
instituted subjects a pole around which to situate an identity and orient 
relations with other (human) subjects, as well promising a degree of material 
security and stability to accompany the spiritual. 
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The nationalities of non-human subjects are, pet passports notwithstanding, 
irrelevant to the perseverance of the nation. If in a radical form the project of 
post-humanism proposes radically altering the human-subject, this will likely 
mean altering the viability or even possibility of the nation-state as a political 
form. This may of course be a desirable outcome, but then our questions 
about posthuman security will no longer involve nations and their subjects as 
the central actors of this drama and so a posthuman post-IR will have to 
undertake rethinking both sides of this dyad. Harrington (this volume) notes 
that ‘To speak of security absent the human subject has been considered 
irrational or worse, uninteresting.’ I might provocatively go one step further, 
speech, absent the human subject, does not seem to me to be something that 
we can speak about (cf. David Roden 2015 on speculative post-humanism 
and the ‘disconnection thesis’).  
Moreover, concrete and historical international relations have to some extent 
developed in the modern period alongside the sciences of and variations on 
the theme of the subject. Metternich’s Concert of Europe was designed to 
suppress or at least control the growing power of national subjectivity: the 
idea being that truly great, autonomous, sovereign men would meet one 
another in order to settle disputes and retain not only their balance of 
territorial power, but also their power over and against the mass of newly 
formed national subjects whose national desires and ambitions, though in 
some cases stoked by these same great men for various purposes, 
threatened to grow out of control, overturning established orders.22 
Metternich’s geo-political dream of an orderly European theatre of interstate 
relations came unravelled, at least in part, precisely due to the growing power 
of the mass political mobilization and mass parties which began to exert 
influence on domestic and international relations. This new form of suddenly 
politically relevant and active human being, the mass subject, was 
technologically mediated in its appearance through the proliferation of 
communication technologies and growing literacy among the labouring 
classes, which made representation by mass parties, with their correlative 
mechanisms of internal and external governance, possible. 
The rise in influence of mass parties in (European) international relations is 
correlated to the emergence of a new form of political subjectivity and power, 
the mass-subject of disciplinary power that Michel Foucault investigates in 
such works as The Birth of the Clinic (1963) and Discipline and Punish: the 
birth of the prison (1975). The development of the human, social, and life 
22  The so-called congress system of European international relations did also have a 
basis in law. The final act of the Vienna Congress stipulated that the border 
arrangements established by the congress could not be altered without agreement from 
the eight signatories (Soutou 2000). 
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sciences in whose frame the human subject gained its sense as an at least 
potentially rational and autonomous agent facilitated the growth of the 
techniques would be used to undermine this rational autonomy in the creation 
of the plastic, normalizable and administered subject of mass-society. This is 
not the place of course to recount this full story and the point of this grossly 
incomplete sketch of the development of the relation between the institution 
of the human subject and the institution of the nation-state is merely to point 
out a correlation between the development of the modern subject and the 
modes and actors of international relations. As Harrington (this volume) 
notes, ‘exploration of alternative political identities beyond the state – such as 
nations, races, classes, movements, religions, cultures, or gender’ (Walker 
1993, cited by Harrington) are not foreign to IR and I do not wish to present 
an overtly state-centric idea of contemporary IR. But I think that the point 
holds, as the universe of IR expands to include institutions other than states, 
such as those mentioned above, the centrality of the human subject remains. 
What Foucault, among others, shows is that the human-subject is not a fixed-
essence with determinate capacities and structures of engaging with the 
world and others in it. Rather, sciences and technologies of the subject have 
developed in correlation with the sciences, techniques, and institutions of 
political life. Further developments, such as the discovery (if that is the right 
term) of the Anthropocene, discussed at considerable length throughout this 
volume, necessitate again a rethinking of this relation between the institutions 
of human-subjectivity and the polis.
The question then is what shift in our thinking about political institutions and 
specifically international relations and security will be enacted if we try to take 
seriously the idea of the post-human as a possible next chapter in this story 
of the modern (European?) human subject. A presupposition and a possible 
paradox should be noted here. First, I presuppose that the notion of the post-
human has not only to do with the human as a biological entity, an individual 
of a group defined by one or another species concept,23 but also, and perhaps 
primarily, with a specific type of subjectivity, namely the conscious, rational, 
and autonomous agent described by modern philosophy, and perhaps most 
exemplary, the addressee of the opening of Immanuel Kant’s essay ‘What Is 
Enlightenment’ who has only to free himself of his ‘self-imposed immaturity’ 
(Kant 1784). Schwarz (this volume) makes a similar point, arguing that 
security, ethics and politics are fundamentally human constructs. I wish to 
push this point a bit further, emphasising aspects of specifically human 
subjectivity.  Thus, the significance of the ‘posthuman’ in the idea of 
posthuman international relations and security pertains not only to a 
23  See here for a short list of species concepts. http://science.kennesaw.
edu/~rmatson/Biol%203380/3380species.html 
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questioning, critique, or de-centering of humans qua individuals or population 
of a particular species, but also to the status of a certain form of subjectivity 
or relation between the individuals of this particular biological species, other 
members of that species, and the surrounding milieu, including of course the 
individuals and populations of the rapidly dwindling multitude of other species 
that make up perhaps the most significant part of our human (species) milieu. 
The possible paradox stems from the presupposition. 
The point that I hoped to make in the paragraphs above is that the political 
form of the nation is closely tied, perhaps inextricably, to a certain 
understanding of the human subject. It is not just that there are no nations 
and no politics without subjects, but also no speech without subjects. If the 
posthuman entails the end or transformation of the specific type of subjectivity 
proper to the political form of the nation, it makes sense to ask how viable the 
very notion of posthuman politics or inter-national relations may be, and what 
security premium we might be willing to pay to maintain the form of 
subjectivity proper and necessary to the nation. Thus I am in obvious 
agreement with Mitchell (this volume) when she argues that it is ‘not possible 
to entirely escape the constructs, norms and shared experiences that help to 
define one’s life as human’ and also Rothe (this volume) in having a suspicion 
about any normative claim to overcome the subject/object divide. However, I 
do not think that we can have anything meaningful to say about what it is like 
to experience, know or act beyond the constraints of subjective life, let alone 
conceive of a politics beyond the subject/object divide. 
Politics is classically and I think ultimately about the life of the polis, a life in 
common shared by human, subjective individuals. If we abandon, either 
epistemologically or ontologically the preconditions of this form of life, i.e. 
subjectivity, I think that we are stepping into a political unknown. I am less 
than convinced that, given the challenges introduced largely by the havoc 
modern human subjects (and perhaps one should add here, European) and 
their political forms have visited upon this planet, those we now associate 
with the term Anthropocene, we should be too quick to jettison either in our 
thinking or our doing, the precondition and indeed constraints of modern 
political life before asking what institutions can follow. I should be clear that I 
consider the human subject one of the foundational institutions of modern 
political life; it is an institution that while foundational of other political 
institutions, is also continuously acted upon and transformed by them. The 
point then, as Fishel (this volume) argues, is not to abandon but to recast the 
institution of the subject such that it is capable of fostering more ‘just and 
peaceful relationships’ with other subjects and with other entities in its milieu. 
Youatt (this volume) makes a similar claim in arguing that thinking how the 
notion of the posthuman could enter into IR discourse entails staying ‘with the 
production of different kinds of humans as a question of political analysis.’
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Thus it is certain that insofar as a posthuman world would mean a post-
subjective world, it will be a world without us as we know us or could think 
about knowing us. As this volume demonstrates, this is by far not the only 
meaning of the posthuman, but it is I think an important one to grapple with. 
From an ecological perspective that tries to place the value of human-
subjective life within a broader value context, wherein other forms of life (non-
human animals, plants, bacteria, etc.) may have value claims made on their 
behalf which equal or even outweigh human claims, a world without human 
subjects is indeed likely to be a more secure or flourishing world. The South 
African philosopher David Benatar (2006) has recently made an argument 
against the continued proliferation of the human species. His argument 
revolves around the inevitability of human suffering; but our own species’ self-
concern aside, it seems a safe bet that the nonhuman subjects of this planet 
would be grateful for such a decision, and those parts of the biome not 
capable of such subject-object relations as gratitude better off. 
The defence of the human subject that I have tabled here certainly does not 
mean that we cannot be critical of the notion of the subject. It is indubitably 
not the case that we must retain a vision of IR or global-security like the one 
imagined by Hans Morgenthau (see Corry, this volume), wherein a science of 
immutable human nature was necessary to understand and order global 
politics. The development of evolutionary biology has already rendered such 
an idea of human nature untenable. As Hull (1986, p.11) argues, ‘any attempt 
to base anything, including ethics or politics, on human nature is basing it on 
historical happenstance.’ 
Thinking Ecologically about Ourselves or Centrifugal-anthropocentrism 
An approach to posthuman IR and security that I would call ecological 
thinking or centrifugal-anthropocentrism, starts from the notion of 
posthumanism as a decentring critique of the primacy of certain forms or 
conceptions of human-subjectivity and argues for an ecological repositioning 
of the human. The term ecological here can be understood in two ways. On 
the one hand is the clear emphasis on ecologies as the focus of IR and 
security discourses. Ecologies can of course be seen as problems to be 
managed toward various human ends, this is the position of climate-change-
updated traditional forms of IR and security discourse. The more radical way 
of thinking the relation between ecologies and security, as suggested by 
McDonald (this volume) is to orient security discourse ‘towards the resilience 
of ecosystems themselves, with this in turn enabling the protection of the 
most vulnerable across time, space and species.’ There seems to me to be a 
risk here that this orientation may reveal to us that the presence of our 
species has, generally speaking, a negative impact on the ecosystems that 
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now become our primary security concern. But an ecological systems 
approach to security, even while retaining a weak anthropocentric 
presupposition, i.e. acknowledging the ‘embeddedness of humans in complex 
worlds co-constituted by diverse beings’ (Mitchell 2014 and this volume) – still 
seems a positive step forward toward greater planetary and indeed human 
security even if it retains an admittedly more relational and inter-dependent 
notion of human life as its central concern. 
The idea of ecology is also relevant in another manner already suggested by 
weak anthropocentrism. The human subject can itself be considered from an 
ecological perspective, not just as functioning within ecologies, but as 
constituted within them. Gut flora is a clear example of this; human microbiota 
are essential to many basic vital human functions, and disturbances within 
the gut microbiome can be extremely detrimental to human health. The same 
holds for other species. It is not just digestive function that can be 
characterised ecologically, the ‘gut microbiota is associated with metabolic 
disorders such as obesity, diabetes mellitus and neuropsychiatric disorders 
such as schizophrenia, autistic disorders, anxiety disorders and major 
depressive disorders’ (Evrensel and Ceylan 2015, p.239). In other words, 
fundamental dimensions of what are considered normal and abnormal human 
subjective functions are linked not to a central pole of consciousness or the 
like but ecological systems constituted in part of other organisms in which 
human subjectivity is constituted and without which it is not possible. What 
such studies call into question is precisely the otherness of other organisms 
and the unity or sameness of ourselves; an ecological approach to 
subjectivity demonstrates that the subject does not belong to a unitary 
species or a unitary body, if that body is somehow purified of its constitutive 
relations with its surrounding milieu. The so-called ‘gut-brain axis’ points, in a 
very concrete fashion, to a way of thinking about posthumanism from a 
radical and perhaps Deleuzian perspective. As Kaltofen (this volume) puts it 
this ‘radical end’ of the posthuman spectrum contends that ‘bodies are not 
bound by skin, but rather by flows of affect and intensity; where thought is not 
human in origin, but non-local and presubjective.’ I am not sure if the gut-
brain axis illustrates all of this, but it does certainly offer a case for saying that 
thought can be partially inhuman in its constitution; or perhaps better that the 
human-subject as normally described in its cognitive, rational and affective 
capacities is ecological in its formation, and that the ecology of the human 
subject contains a multitude of different species.    
Insofar as we are still concerned with the condition and perhaps the 
flourishing of the human subject, that is, insofar as we remain at least ‘weakly 
anthropocentric’, our anthropocentrism has to become centrifugal (and in the 
case of gut flora centripetal). This means not only broadening the universe of 
IR to not just include but place at its centre, ecological well-being. At the 
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same time, while I maintain that the notion of IR does not make sense outside 
of the frame of subjectivity, ecological thinking forces us to consider the 
constitution of the subject qua ecology as relational, integrated, impure. One 
outcome from this might be to say that the human subject is one of the 
ecologies that we should aim to secure so that it maintains certain capacities 
that we consider necessary for flourishing; and capacities that allow it to 
minimise the risk it poses to other ecologies and to its own. An ecology of the 
human-subject is constituted in part by some cell populations that we call our 
own, gut microbes, technologies like writing, political institutions like human 
rights, etc. I think that what is important here is understanding how to 
maintain an equilibrium in which capacities that we value emerge and persist. 
So what is called for is an approach that views the concerns of IR or security 
discourse within nested ecologies which contain, gut-microbiota, organs, 
human and nonhuman subjects, etc. as well as institutions such as the 
nation-state or international governance bodies? Security, in this context 
means maintaining certain ecologies, including the ecology of the human-
subject and taking seriously the idea of inter-dependence and co-constitution 
that sits at the heart of ecological thinking. Jon Turney (2016) has recently 
discussed the use of militarised immunity language in medical discourse. We 
can flip this and critique the use of militarised immune metaphors in security 
discourse. Attempts to isolate nested ecologies from their milieu as though 
they were self-sufficient substances and not networks of interchange, and this 
includes attempts to isolate the subject either epistemically or 
environmentally, only make them more fragile. Turney argues that it is time to 
abandon outdated notions of how the immune systems works which conceive 
of it as a barrier against threats to bodily integrity. Instead as the gut-
microbiota example illustrates, ‘[t]he immune system keeps host and 
microbiome in equilibrium. There is continual action and reaction, like the give 
and take of a regular conversation. The results help to nurture some bacteria, 
while reducing opportunities for others (Turney 2016). This revised immune 
thinking should take its place not only in relation to how we conceive the 
body, but also how we think about the broader posthuman ecology of IR and 
security discourse. We need to maintain equilibriums in ecologies that we 
value. One such ecology may be the human subject itself.
Call the Turing Cops? 
In William Gibson’s famous cyberpunk novel Neuromancer (1984), the Turing 
Police are an international law enforcement agency who monitor and enforce 
laws pertaining to the behavior of artificial intelligences. It is curious that in a 
volume devoted to posthuman IR and security the subject of big data and 
associated phenomena (cf. Boyd and Crawford 2011) seem not to be at the 
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forefront. There is no call to start training Turing Cops in this volume. 
Nonetheless, it is certainly the case that many if not all of the contributions 
here acknowledge that human-machine hybridity – or the technological 
mediation of the human being – is a central concern for post-human thinking. 
The anthropologist Leroi-Gourhan (1973) characterises the emergence of the 
human precisely by the ‘exteriorization’ of capacities through technology. I do 
not think that arguments in favour of epistemological, ontological or normative 
human-machine hybridity depart from the domain of human subjectivity 
conceived ecologically. To the contrary, one can argue, as Leroi-Gourhan 
does, that subjectivity only emerges in this technological hybridity or 
exteriorisation.   
Yet, it seems a pressing question for posthuman IR and security to ask what 
challenges or threats are posed by the advent of big data technologies and 
how the insertion of these technologies into natural-institutional ecologies like 
the ones mentioned briefly above is likely to alter their configurations and the 
capacities that they produce. Danaher (2016) refers to the threat of 
‘algocracy’: algorithms are increasingly being assigned control over political 
decision making-processes. Danaher concludes that we are increasingly 
divesting governance processes of possibilities for human participation; a 
very clear sense of what posthuman security and IR might mean. We could 
push this question even further and ask if the increased frequency by which 
digital, algorithmically driven, cognitive artefacts24 are integrated into already 
ecological (think gut microbiota) cognitive and decision-making processes 
poses a threat to the stability of the equilibrium that we refer to (often 
normatively) as human subjectivity? Does the introduction of the technologies 
grouped under the umbrella into the ecology of human subjectivity place 
certain capacities at risk? Do new capacities emerge, what is the trade off? 
This seems like a case for the Turing Police. It seems likely that this is not a 
purely speculative question. There are numerous experiments testing if 
sensory substitution devices (SSDs) can become part of extended cognitive 
systems (e.g. Hurley and Noë 2003; Bach-y-Rita and Kercel 2003; Dotov, Nie, 
and Chemero 2010). The experiments have shown that in fact sensory-
substitution devices can become part of extended cognitive systems and 
additionally these artefacts partially constitute the extended cognitive system. 
This reinforces Leroi-Gourhan’s much earlier point. The point, coarsely, is that 
cognitive artefacts do not always remain stand-apart supports for human 
cognitive systems, but rather become aspects of cognitive ecologies, thus 
transforming them. If, as Leroi-Gourhan argues, this is not new, but the very 
definition of the human, then our main concern is not necessarily whether 
these new forms of hybridity mark a break between the human and the 
24  Cognitive artifacts are devices designed to maintain, display, or operate upon 
information in order to serve a representational function and that affect human cognitive 
performance (Norman 1991).
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posthuman; indeed by this account we have always been posthuman. The 
question is if and how ecologies which sustain things that we value about 
human subjectivity are altered and in what ways.  
Perhaps in asking about the relation between the discourses about 
posthumanism, the human subject, IR, security and the existential challenges 
created by climate change and the Anthropocene – the constellation of 
concepts that this volume bravely takes on – there is a choice to be had: work 
towards securing the ecological/centrifugal subject as a rational and also 
potentially caring actor capable of at least tying to address the existential 
security challenges posed by the Anthropocene or admit that the planetary 
system (Gaia) would be better off without human beings or human subjects. 
In other words, if we accept the centrifugal notion of the subject that I 
propose, and also the centrality of human subjectivity to any discussion of 
politics that we can fathom; then we should try to maintain within this 
ecological picture the subjective capacities that we care about and which we 
will undoubtedly need to address the ecological challenges facing the planet. 
These seem to me to be the two epistemologically coherent options. The 
notion of the posthuman considered in biological or even functional terms is 
of course interesting and important, but it is not what is paramount here, since 
it is – I contend – the human subject and not just the human that matters to 
politics (IR and security included) properly speaking. The idea of post-
subjective IR or security is not something that I think we as subjects can say 
anything about. 
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